International Conference on
Tense and Aspect in Conditionals

INALCO, Paris, November 2-4, 2022

Organizer: **Ghanshyam Sharma (INALCO, PLIDAM, LABEX-EFL)**

Scientific committee:

Anne Abeillé (University of Paris)

Ana Arregui (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA)

Rajesh Bhatt (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA)

Patrick Caudal (CNRS, University of Paris)

Jiyoung Choi (INALCO, CRLAO)

Bridgit Copley (CNRS, University of Paris)

Östen Dahl (University of Stockholm, Sweden)

Anaïd Donabedian-Demopoulos (INALCO)

Paul Égré (IJN, CNRS)

Michela Ippolito (University of Toronto)

David Over (University of Durham, UK)

Hadil Karawani (University of Konstanz, Germany)

Stefan Kaufmann (University of Connecticut, USA)

Alda Mari (ENS, IJN, CNRS)

Ghanshyam Sharma (PLIDAM, INALCO)

Thomas Szende (PLIDAM, INALCO)

Sophie Vassilaki (INALCO, SeDyL)

Auditorium – INALCO, 65 rue des Grands Moulins, 75214 Paris Cedex 13

Local Organisation

Cristina Birsan (INALCO, PLIDAM)
Vidishaa Prakaash (University of Paris 3- INALCO)

Auditorium – INALCO, 65 rue des Grands Moulins, 75214 Paris Cedex 13

	November 2, 2022
08:30	Registration
09:00	Welcome
09:00 10:00	**INVITED TALK** <u>Östen Dahl,</u> *Revisiting the marking of counterfactuality* Discussant: Karawani
10:00 10:30	**Coffee Break**
	Session 1 – Chair: Stefan Kaufmann
10:30 11:00	Naoaki Wada *Tense and Aspect in Conditionals: A Contrastive Study of English and Japanese*
11:00 11:30	Haruka Shimura *On the future perfect in English open conditionals and their Japanese correspondents*
11:30 12:00	Matthew Cummins *Ambiguities in Tense Interpretation in Tyneside English*
12:00 14:00	**Lunch**
14:00 15:00	**INVITED TALK** <u>Stefan Kaufmann</u> *Shifty if's iffy shifts* Discussant: Atle Grønn
	Session 2 – Chair: Östen Dahl
15:30 15:30	Karawani & Reintges *The Coptic Conditional Conjugation as a Certainty Conditional*
15:30 16:00	Ezra La Roi *The life cycles of counterfactual conditionals in Ancient Greek: aspect, actionality and temporal reference*
16:00 16:30	Vesela Simeonova, *Evidentials in counterfactuals: real or fake?*
16:30 17:00	**Coffee Break**
	Session 3 – Chair: Michela Ippolito
17:00 17:30	Enzo Laurenti, *Conditionals, desires and conditional desires in French*
17:30 18:00	Fabio Del Prete, *Imperfetto in Italian irrealis conditionals*
18:30 19:00	Lorenzo Rossi & Caterina Sisti, *Variable-hypotheticals conditionals*
19:00	**Reception**

Auditorium – INALCO, 65 rue des Grands Moulins, 75214 Paris Cedex 13

	November 3, 2022
09:00 10:00	**INVITED TALK** Hadil Karawani, *On the role of 'repurposed' past and 'fake' imperfective in counterfactuals* Discussant: Michela Ippolito
10:00 10:30	**coffee break**
Session 4 – Chair: Michela Ippolito	
10:30 11:00	Zahra Mirrazi, *Presuppositions of Tense and Strength of Counterfactuality*
11:00 11:30	Laura H. Merino, *Inventory and Prototipicality of Conditional Constructions in Spanish*
11:30 12:00	Lin Xiao, *Typological markers associated with the Protasis-apodosis systems, including the hypothetical conditional constructions, from a cross-linguistic perspective*
12:00 14:00	**Lunch**
14:00 15:00	**INVITED TALK** Ana Arregui, *Modal aspect in conditionals* Discussant: Östen Dahl
Session 5 – Chair: Stefan Kaufmann	
15:30 15:30	Patrizia Noel, *German(ic) V1 conditionals from syntax to morphology*
15:30 16:00	Ainur Kakimova, *The morphosyntax of X-marking in Kazakh, Russian and Polish languages*
16:00 16:30	Frank Sode, *The argument-status of non-logical 'if'-clauses: Evidence from German*
16:30 17:00	**coffee break**
Session 6 – Chair: Hadil Karawani	
17:00 17:30	Liliane Hodieb, *A cognitive account of the role of and relationship between the hypothetical/ conditional marker and the distal/ past tense marker in* Wushi
17:30 18:00	Jumanah Abdulwahab Abu-Sulaiman, *Past tense and the counterfactual complementizer law in Makkan Arabic*
18:30 19:00	Rania Talbi-Boulhais, *Les prépositions A et DE dans l'expression de l'hypothèse en espagnol*
19:00	**Conference Dinner**

Auditorium – INALCO, 65 rue des Grands Moulins, 75214 Paris Cedex 13

	November 4, 2022
09:00 10:00	**INVITED TALK** Michela Ippolito, *Past or modal?* Discussant: Stefan Kaufmann
10:00 10:30	**coffee break**
Session 7 – Chair: Arregui	
10:30 11:00	Cris Chatterjee, *Conditional backshift: backshifted verb forms in conditionals do not encode or implicate improbability, negative epistemic stance or counterfactuality*
11:00 11:30	Daria Sidorkina, *Hunting for Khanty X-marking*
11:30 12:00	Miki Nishioka & Ranjana Narsimhan*, A Comparative Study of Conditional Sentences in Hindi and Japanese*
12:00 14:00	**Lunch**
14:00 15:00	**INVITED TALK** <u>Atle Grønn</u>, *Meaningless past, subjunctive and perfect in counterfactuals* Discussant: Ana Arregui
Session 8 – Chair Atle Grønn	
15:30 15:30	Teruyuki Mizuno, *Strategies for Anderson conditionals: their implications to the typology of O- and X-markings*
15:30 16:00	Bergül Soykan, *Past in Turkish Conditionals*
16:00 16:30	Sayantani Banerjee, *Case and aspect in Bangla non-finite conditional*
16:30 17:00	coffee break
Session 9 – Chair: Hadil Karawani	
17:00 17:30	Peter E. Hook, *Occurrence in rebutted protases as compound verb triggers in Hindi-Urdu*
17:30 18:00	Sunil Bhatt, *The Conditional in Hindi-Urdu: A perfect representation of aspects*
18:30 19:00	Aurore Tirard, *Conditionals in Romani*
19:00	Thanks!

Contents

Invited Talks

1. **Ana Arregui,** Associate Professor, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA
   Modal aspect in conditionals

Lewis (1973) proposed an analysis of counterfactual conditionals (e.g. (i)) which was not meant to apply to all so-called 'subjunctive' conditionals. He noted that 'subjunctive' examples like (ii) seemed to have the truth-conditions of an indicative conditional instead of a counterfactual:

(i)   If kangaroos had not tails, they would topple over.
(ii) If our ground troops entered Laos next year, there would be trouble.

In this presentation I would like to revisit Lewis's conclusion that a unified analysis is not possible. Building on Arregui (2007), I will argue that aspect plays an important modal role in the interpretation of *would*-conditionals. Drawing on data from English and Spanish, I will argue that aspect in this environment is not *fake*. It introduces a modal dimension that results in epistemic effects. The upshot is that in examples like (ii), the overall interpretation of the conditional is relevantly similar to that of an indicative, in spite of a unified analysis for the modal.

❖

2. **Östen Dahl,** Professor Emeritus, University of Stockholm, Sweden
   Revisiting the marking of counterfactuality

A quarter of a century ago, I published a paper entitled "The relation between past time reference and counterfactuality: a new look", where I criticized the idea that the role of past tenses in the marking of counterfactuality could be explained by seeing past tenses and counterfactuals as sharing a common meaning or by assuming that non-temporal uses of past tenses are extensions from their basic, temporal meanings. One difficulty that I pointed to was the fact that past tenses relatively rarely are the only marking in counterfactual constructions. I also noted that the "irreality" of counterfactuality marking depends on the time referred to in the sense that the markings that are used for past counterfactual statements often express "contrary to assumption" rather than "contrary to fact" when used about the present or future. I then suggested that the key to the role of past tenses in counterfactuality marking could be the grammaticalization processes by which the marking develops. Counterfactual marking starts out in past contexts, as it is there that the distinction between real and unreal is most crucial. It will typically involve a combination of modal and temporal (past) marking. The reinterpretation of the past element as part of a composite expression of counterfactuality makes possible the use of the construction in non-past contexts with a simultaneous weakening of the counterfactuality element, which, in its turn, may trigger the addition of another past morpheme to the construction when used in the past. Evidence for such a process can be found in various languages, some of which had already been discussed in the literature; further examples have been added later.

Returning in 2022 to the field of counterfactuality marking, I find that the relationship between counterfactuality and past tenses is still at the centre of attention but that the proposed solutions do not differ much from the ones I criticized. I have been asked to comment on a recent paper by Kai von Fintel and Sabina Iatridou; in a way, it is not so easy to critique them since their conclusions are very modest. However, they postulate three methodological principles, which can be summarized by the terms universality, meaning invariance, and compositionality. I will argue that these principles cannot be upheld if we want to come to an understanding of counterfactuality in grammar, and I will discuss the problems that arise for each of them. This will take me to the application of perspectives from language typology, diachronic grammar, and pragmatics. Among other things, I will argue that the way grammatical systems evolve sometimes makes it unrealistic to expect full compositionality of grammatical markings. I will also question the wisdom of assuming that all languages have a grammaticalized marking of counterfactual sentences and discuss the role of pragmatic factors behind the use of counterfactual marking in deontic and boulomaic modality contexts.

References

Dahl, Östen. 1997. The relation between past time reference and counterfactuality: a new look. A. Athanasiadou & R. Dirven (eds.), *On Conditionals Again* (pp. 97–114). Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Fintel, Kai von & Iatridou, Sabine. 2022. Prolegomena to a theory of X-marking. Ms. under review. URL: http://mit.edu/fintel/fintel-iatridou-2022-x.pdf.

❖

3.   **Atle Grønn**, University of Oslo
   Meaningless past, subjunctive and perfect in counterfactuals

We will develop a feature system – with interpretable semantic features and uninterpretable morphological features – which can account for the presence of temporal and subjunctive morphology in counterfactuals when the morphology is semantically void.

Two key ingredients are necessary for such a system to work: We have temporal control from the modal in the matrix to the adjunct (if-clause), and we have a system for feature transmission under semantic binding (akin to sequence of tense). We extend the system to account also for the semantically void perfect in the if-clause of past counterfactuals.

The system was developed in joint unpublished work with Arnim von Stechow. Our ambition was to cover a wide range of Indo-European languages, notably English, German, Norwegian, French, Italian, Spanish, Latin, Greek, Russian, Ukrainian etc.

❖

4.   **Michela Ippolito,** Department of Linguistics, University of Toronto, Canada
   Past or modal?

Elaborating on earlier work (starting with Ippolito 2002 Ph.D. dissertation), Ippolito 2013 proposed an analysis of different types of so-called subjunctive conditionals. The term 'subjunctive conditionals' was used mostly for historical reasons and to ensure continuity with an

already existing literature (in philosophy and linguistics) that had long been interested in the semantics of these conditionals but had mostly focused on familiar languages that (at least at some point) possessed a morphologically distinct subjunctive mood. However, Iatridou (2000) pointed out that a large number of (genetically unrelated) languages mark so-called subjunctive conditionals by using past tense morphology. Since then, elaborating on this important observation, theories of subjunctive conditionals have mostly fallen into two camps: to use Schulz's terminology, the *past-as-past theories*, where the past which marks these conditionals is interpreted temporally, and *past-as-modal theories*, where the past tense we see in subjunctive conditionals receives a modal interpretation. The goal of my previous work in this area of research was to develop an analysis where the semantic properties of these conditionals would follow from the temporal interpretation of the past tense (a past-as-past theory). In this talk I will review some key elements of the debate over the last 20 years with the goal of highlighting at least some of the issues and points of contention that linguists and philosophers have raised in the last two decades, and look at the current state of this debate.

References

Iatridou 2000 "The grammatical ingredients of counterfactuality". *Linguistic Inquiry*, 31(2). 231–270.

Ippolito 2002 *The time of possibilities: truth and felicity conditions of subjunctive conditionals*, Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT.

Ippolito 2013 *Subjunctive conditionals: a linguistic analysis*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Mackay (2017) "Past tense and past times in subjunctive conditionals", in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*.

Mackay (2019) "Modal interpretation of tense in subjunctive conditionals" in *Semantics & Pragmatics* 12.2 (2019), 1–29.

Schulz (2014) "Fake Tense in conditional sentences: a modal approach", in *Natural Language Semantics*, 22, 117–144.

Von Prince (2019) "Counterfactuality and past", in *Linguistics and Philosophy* 42, 577–615.

❖

5. **Hadil Karawani,** Department of Philosophy, Konstanz University, Germany
   On the role of 'repurposed' past and 'fake' imperfective in counterfactuals

Languages often encode counterfactuality through the appearance of 'fake' or 'repurposed' past tense and imperfective aspect morphology that does not receive its standard interpretation (cf. Iatridou 2000). There are several accounts of 'repurposed' morphology in counterfactuals (CFs) that focus on the use of past tense morphology (Iatridou 2000, 2009; Ippolito 2002, 2003, 2006; Han 2006; Ogihara 2000; Arregui 2004, 2008). With respect to 'repurposed' aspect, however, much less has been said (cf. Iatridou 2009; Arregui 2004, 2007).

Focusing my attention on the meaning of past morphology and its contribution to the meaning of CFs, I note that, in a way, everybody agrees that the meaning of past morphology is the unequal, but they disagree with respect to its index – as to whether it is able to range over times (and hence is fake in CF environments) or in fact it ranges over times and worlds. I opt for the latter. By doing so, I argue for the view that it is a "historical mistake" (to quote Iatridou 2000) to view the meaning of past morphology as basically temporal.

I argue that, in order to account for conditionals in particular, but also tense in general, we need branching histories (also known as a "branching times") and we need possible worlds. One can emulate the possible world via branching – which is what proponents of the past-as-tense camp do – and one can emulate the branching via possible worlds – which is what the proponents of the past-as-modal camp do – but, I will show that that ends up mixing virtues with vice. There are examples for which the one approach is favourable, and others for which the other approach is favourable, but to account for a wide array of examples one needs the fusion I propose here.

I also focus my attention on the distribution of aspect in counterfactual environments, bringing in data from Amharic, Arabic, Greek, Hindi and Zulu. Focusing on the question of what accounts for the cross-linguistic differences we see in how 'standard' aspect (and tense) is realized in CF constructions, I propose that languages attempt to maximize the exponents of tense/aspect that correspond to the interpretation of the sentence, while still always realizing the 'fake' tense/aspect morphology required by the CF construction. This conclusion suggests that 'fake' aspect selected in these constructions is an indirect expression of counterfactuality – and is better treated as an embedding phenomenon rather than a means of conveying counterfactual modality, per se.

❖

6. **Stefan Kaufmann,** Associate Professor, Department of Linguistics, University of Connecticut, USA
   Shifty if's iffy shifts

Conditional constructions create special environments for the interpretation of their constituents. The semantic contribution of temporal, aspectual and modal expressions in conditionals can differ in puzzling ways from their "ordinary" meaning in simple matrix clauses. Formal semanticists did not pay much attention to this phenomenon until around the turn of the millennium, but by now we have a good understanding of some basic patterns and the beginnings of a cross-linguistic perspective. However, there is still much debate on how these expression take on their special meanings in conditionals, and how (or indeed whether) those special meanings are related to the meanings they have outside of conditionals. An additional question from a cross-linguistic perspective is whether these processes are invariant, thus presumably reflecting extra-linguistic cognitive tendencies, or disparate, language-specific results of accidental conventionalization. I do not have the answers to these questions, but in this talk I will present a framework for addressing them, developed for English *if*-sentences and tested against a range of other languages and constructions. One of its hallmarks is an integrated analysis of "indicative" and "subjunctive" conditionals, capturing the peculiarities of temporal interpretation in both. Another hallmark is a novel approach to the role of "fake Past" in conditionals.

❖

Open Submissions

7. **Jumanah Abdulwahab Abu-Sulaiman**, Assistant Professor, Department of English, Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah, Saudi Arabia
Past tense and the counterfactual complementizer law in Makkan Arabic

It has been debated whether past tense in counterfactual (CF) statements: is "fake" (i.e. loses its temporal properties (Iatridou, 2000; Karawani 2014)) or "real" (Ippolito 2002, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2013; Arregui 2005; Schulz 2017; von Prince 2019). These works are predominantly on English, Modern Greek, and Romance languages; The role of past tense in languages where counterfactuality is encoded by dedicated morphology has not received sufficient attention in the literature, to the exception of Karawani (2014), who presents the CF complementizer *law* in Palestinian Arabic.

This talk presents novel CF data on the interaction of law and past tense from Makkan Arabic (MA). It offers an alternative proposal for *law* in MA where *law* receives an independent denotation, and past tense is treated as "real".

(1) law kaan   zurtinit   fi bayti,
     If   kaan.PST.3.SG   visit.PERF.you.F.me at home.my,
     kaan   xabaz-t-lik   cheesecake
     kaan.PST.3.SG bake.PERF.1.for.you   cheesecake
     'If you had visited me at home, I would have baked a cheesecake for you.' (CF, Past orientation)

(2) ʔiða(*law) zurtini   fi bayti, ħa.ʔaxbiz.lik   cheesecake
      If   visit.PFV.You.F.me at home, Fut.bake.IMPRFV.1.for.you.F. cheesecake
     'If you visit me at home, I will bake a cheesecake for you.'   (Indicative conditional, Future possibilities)

(3) law ħaḍarti   l-faraħ   bukrah. ,kaan   ʔanbasaṭi
     law attend.PFV.You.F.SG. the-wedding tomorrow, kaan.PST.3.SG. enjoy.PERF.You.F.SG.
     'If you attended the wedding tomorrow, you would enjoy it.'   (CF, future)

(4) law tiħḍuri   l-faraħ.   daħeen, tinbasṭi
     law attend.IMPRFV.You.F.SG. the-wedding now ,   enjoy.IMPRFV.You.F.SG.
     'If you attended the wedding now, you would enjoy it.'   (CF, Present)

Proposal: For the structure of the CF *law*, I follow Kratzer's (1991: 2012) treatment of the conditional structures as a tripartite structure. This structure consists of the accessibility relation R, the if-clause is interpreted in the domain of the covert modal operator and the consequent is interpreted in the nuclear scope. Note that this covert modal operator is overtly expressed by *law* in MA. The accessibility relation R quantifies over similar worlds to the world of evaluation and the time of evaluation.

Secondly, given the loss of the temporal interpretations inside CFs, I claim that past perfect aspect triggers a back-shifting process to the past following Ippolito (2013) and von Prince

(2019). Under back-shifting, past perfect locates the speaker into the past where there are similar CF worlds to the actual world (Arregui 2005), or historical accessible world (Ippolito 2013); eventualities inside these worlds share the same episodic past with the event in the actual world, yet they were not completed in the past. Accordingly, I treat past events as "real" inside CFs.

Finally, considering the intuitions of *law* of yielding counterfactuality, I postulate the existence of a pragmatic principle that holds counterfactuality across similar historical worlds. Since *law* is lexically encoded for counterfactuality, I argue for the presence of what can be called "Preservation of Counterfactulity Description" (PCD). This PCD is an alternative from Ippolito's presupposition; it is based on Hacquard's (2006, 2009, 2010) pragmatic principle "Preservation of Event Description" (PED) across worlds for invoking actuality entailments.

References

Arregui, A. C. (2005). *On the Accessiblity of Possible Worlds: The Role of Tense and Aspect*. University of Massachusetts Amherst.

Hacquard, V. (2006). *Aspects of modality*. Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Hacquard, V. (2009). On the interaction of aspect and modal auxiliaries. *Linguistics and philosophy*, *32*(3), 279-315.

Hacquard, V. (2010). On the event relativity of modal auxiliaries. *Natural language semantics*, *18*(1), 79-114.

Iatridou, S. (2000). The grammatical ingredients of counterfactuality. *Linguistic inquiry*, *31*(2), 231-270.

Ippolito, M. (2002). On the temporal dimension of counterfactuality. In *Northeast Linguistics Society* (Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 15).

Ippolito, M. (2003). Presuppositions and implicatures in counterfactuals. *Natural language semantics*, *11*(2), 145-186.

Ippolito, M. (2006). Semantic composition and presupposition projection in subjunctive conditionals. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, *29*(6), 631-672.

Ippolito, M. (2008). Subjunctive conditionals. In *Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung* (Vol. 12, pp. 256-270).

Ippolito, M. (2013). *Subjunctive conditionals: A linguistic analysis* (Vol. 65). MIT Press.

Karawani, H. (2014). *The real, the fake, and the fake fake: In counterfactual conditionals, crosslinguistically*. Netherlands Graduate School of Linguistics.

Kratzer, A. (1991). *Semantics: An international handbook of contemporary research*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Kratzer, A. (2012). *Modals and conditionals: New and revised perspectives* (Vol. 36). Oxford University Press.

Schulz, K. (2017). Fake perfect in X-marked conditionals. In *Semantics and Linguistic Theory* (Vol. 27, pp. 547-570).

von Prince, K. (2019). Counterfactuality and past. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, *42*(6), 577-615.

❖

8. **Sayantani Banerjee**, Research scholar, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, New Delhi, India
    Case and aspect in Bangla non-finite conditional

Following Zbavitel (1970), Modern Bangla has three types of non-finite verbal participials. The morpho-phonological forms of these three non-finite bound forms are *-te, -le* and *-e*. The *-te* form is the imperfective non-finite participle and the *-e* form is the perfective participle. The *-le* is a non-finite conditional participle. This information plays a big role in my analysis to explain the anomalies seen in with these forms. For example:

(1) *ami*   *beri-ye*   *pheSad-e*   *por-l-am*
     I.nom go-nonfin.perf   problem-loc get-PST--1p
     'After I went out, I got into a problem.'
(2) *ami*   *bero-te*   *jhor e-l-o*
     I.nom go-nonfin.imp storm   come-PST-3P
     'When I went out, storm came.'
(3) **ami*   *beri-ye*   *jhor*   *e-l-o*
     I. nom go-nonfin.perf   storm   come-PST--3p
     'When I have gone out, storm came.'
(4) *ami*   *bero-le*   *tumi*   *ash-b-e*
     I.nom go-nonfin.cond you.nom come-FUT-2p
     'If I go, you will come.'   Standard Bangla

In (1), there is a non-finite perfective verb *beriye* and the DP *ami* is assigned with nominative case by the finite verb *porlam*. In (2), we see the imperfective counterpart of non-finite verb '*bero-te'*. However in (3), the ungrammaticality of -ye marker can be noticed. (4) bears non- finite conditional *berole* with the finite verb *ashbe* and two morphologically unmarked DPs assigned with nominative case. Departing from such data, the research questions of the paper are how aspect are represented in Bangla non-finite conditionals and how does the aspectual information interact with conditionals in Bangla? Banerjee (2021) talks about interaction of aspectual information and case marking in non-finite imperfective and perfective participle in Bangla, however the use of -le is relatively unexplored. Though -le marker does not bear aspect morphology (Guha, 2022), it shows similar behaviour with non-finite imperfective *-te* as seen in (2) and (3). Both of them allows nominative case marked DPs in its consequent clauses. However there are some subtle differences: For example:

(5) ami   bero-le,   jhor   ashlo/ elo
     I.nom go-non-fin.cond   storm come-PST-3p
     'If I went out, storm came'

In (5), we see -*le* has restrictions with past tense. Thus, the paper relooks at Bangla conditionals to see how it interacts with aspectectual information.

References

Banerjee, S (2022). 'Non-canonical nominative case assignment' in the *Bulletin of the Department of Linguistics,* Calcutta University [ISSN 2310-6165]

Guha, I. (2022). Revisiting Conditional Typology for Bangla. *Formal Approaches to South Asian Languages*.

Zbavitel, D. (1970). *Nonfinite verbal forms in Bengali.* Prague: Oriental Institute. Czechoslovak Akademy of Sciences.

❖

9. **Sunil Bhatt,** Asian Studies, University of British Columbia, 1871 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada
The Conditional in Hindi-Urdu: A perfect representation of aspects

The Hindi-Urdu language has an elaborate system of tenses that encompasses a four-fold aspectual category: indefinite (not considered as an aspect because of its unmarked nature), habitual, perfective and progressive. However, not all tenses, moods, and verbs have representations in all four aspects. In some cases, some aspectual representations simply do not exist and in other cases, only the verb *honā*, "to be" is the sole representative of the whole category. Only the conditional mood along with the subjunctive in Hindi-Urdu has the representation in all four aspectual categories. Below is the table that attempts to demonstrate the verb form structure with aspects in columns, and tenses and moods in rows.

	Indefinite	Definite		
	Simple	Habitual	Perfective	Progressive
Participle	-*	Habitual [ātā]	Perfective [āyā]	Progressive [ā rahā]
Present	Simple Present** [hai]	Habitual Present [ātā hai]	Perfective Present [āyā hai]	Present Progressive [ā rahā hai]
Past	Simple Past ** [thā]	Habitual Past [ātā thā]	Perfective Past [āyā thā]	Past Progressive [ā rahā thā]
Historic	-*	Historic Habitual Tense [ātā]	Historic Perfective Tense [āyā]	-*
Future	Simple Future [āegā]	-*	-*	-*
Presumptive	Simple Presumptive** [hogā]	Habitual Presumptive [ātā hogā]	Perfective Presumptive [āyā hogā]	Presumptive Progressive [ā rahā hogā]
Subjunctive	Simple Subjunctive [āe]	Habitual Subjunctive [ātā ho]	Perfective Subjunctive [āyā ho]	Subjunctive Progressive [ā rahā ho]
Conditional	Simple Conditional [ātā]	Habitual Conditional [ātā hotā]	Perfective Conditional [āyā hotā]	Conditional Progressive [ā rahā hotā]

*Aspectual representation does not exist
**Only the verb *honā* is the sole representative of the whole category.

In the table above, the entire system is represented in rows and columns and the verb *ānā – to come* is taken to give examples with the subject in third person masculine singular *vah* (he). The empty slots are shown with an asterisk (*) and the double-asterisk (**) shows that only the verb *honā*, "to be" has the forms belonging to the particular cell. The morphological empty slots are filled by the semantic shift that occurs in the other forms, for example, the cell for Simple Past is filled by the Historical Perfective Tense as shown by the arrow. After carefully examining the table, one can see that only Conditional and Subjunctive have representation in all the cells i.e. in all aspects.

In this paper, I would present the entire aspectual structure of the Hind-Urdu verb and show that the conditional and the subjunctive are the only two verbal categories that have a precise representation of all the aspects, including the unmarked category of indefinite tense.

❖

10. **Cris Chatterjee**, Northumbria University, UK
Conditional backshift: backshifted verb forms in conditionals do not encode or implicate improbability, negative epistemic stance or counterfactuality

This piece sets out to challenge the prevailing view that conditional backshift entails or implicates improbability, negative epistemic stance or counterfactuality.

(1)   a. If you leave now, you'll miss the traffic
        b. If you left now, you'd miss the traffic.
        c. If you'd left earlier, you'd have missed the traffic.

Conditionals such as (1a-c) are referred to here as TYPES 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Type 1 conditionals use present tense verb forms conventionally to refer to present or future time. Type 2 conditionals also refer to present or future time, but use preterite verb forms instead of present tense ones. This use of preterite forms in conditionals to refer to non-past time (i.e. present or future time) is here termed CONDITIONAL BACKSHIFT (henceforth CB). CB also refers to the use of preterite perfect forms to refer to events or situations that we would otherwise use simple preterite forms for, as in (1c). Here there is no indication of a time anterior to another past time. Types 2 and 3 are both referred to here as backshifted conditionals (henceforth BCs).

The basic idea propounded in the literature on backshift is that, for type 2 conditionals, CB indicates that the speaker views the proposition in the antecedent with NEGATIVE EPISTEMIC STANCE (NES). In other words, they view it as unlikely, improbable, contrary to assumption or contrary to expectation (Aarts 2011, Akatsuka 1985, Athanasiadou & Dirven 1997, Comrie 1986, Dahl 1997, Dancygier & Sweetser 2005, Declerck & Reed 2001, Fillmore 1990, Huddleston & Pullum 2002, Jackson 1990, Quirk et al. 1985). So Huddleston & Pullum (2005: 46), for example, say that the type 2 conditional (1b) 'presents your leaving as somewhat less likely' than (1a). Type 3 conditionals are usually regarded as counterfactual, in other words, according to such accounts the situation described in the antecedent is viewed by the speaker as contrary to fact.

Many scholars acknowledge that these meanings are conversational implicatures, which may therefore be cancelled (Declerk & Reed 2001, Edgington 1995, Iatridou 2000, Wierzbicka 1997).

Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 749), for example, observe that in context, the antecedent of the type 3 conditional in (2) does not convey counterfactuality:

(2)   I don't know whether he broke it or not, but I doubt it; if he had done, he would probably have told her about it.

Such authors, however, mostly ascribe no other meaning to CB and cannot explain why BCs are used for non-counterfactual sentences.

The paper is in two parts. In the first, theoretical evidence is presented setting out the case against CB entailing or implicating improbability or NES on the part of speakers. The second part presents the results of a research survey administered to 1,300 native-speaker respondents from a Russell group university, which provides overwhelming evidence that there is no NES conveyed by CB. Importantly, respondents were given type 2 and 3 conditionals in which there was no cancellation of any NES implicature, but in which on balance they decided that the speaker felt that the antecedent situation was likely to be true. The same survey given to ESL teachers and non-native English speakers showed these respondents were more likely to attribute counterfactual or NES readings to utterances to which native speakers would not, suggesting that the current view is damaging for language pedagogy as well as theoretical linguistics.

References

Aarts, B. 2011: *Oxford modern English grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Akatsuka, N. 1986: Conditionals are discourse-bound. In: Traugott et al. (eds.), 333–351. Athanasiadou, A. and R. Dirven (eds.). 1997: *On conditionals again*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Athanasiadou, A. and R. Dirven. 1997: Conditionality, hypotheticality, counterfactuality. In: Athanasiadou, A., and R. Dirven (eds.), 61–96.

Comrie, B. 1986: Conditionals, a typology. In: Traugott et al. (eds.), 77–99.

Dahl, Ö. 1997: The relation between past time reference and counterfactuality: a new look. In: A. Athanasiadou and R. Dirven (eds.), 97–114.

Dancygier, B. and E. Sweetser. 2005: *Mental spaces in grammar*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Declerck, R. and S. Reed. 2001: *Conditionals: a comprehensive empirical analysis*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Edgington, Dorothy. 1995: On conditionals. *Mind* 104(414): 235–329.

Fillmore, C. J. 1990: Epistemic stance and grammatical form in English conditional sentences. *CLS* 26: 137–162.

Huddleston, R. and G. K. Pullum. 2002: *The Cambridge grammar of the English language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huddleston, R. and G. K. Pullum. 2005: *A student's introduction to English grammar*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Iatridou, S. 2000: The grammatical ingredients of counterfactuality. *Linguistic Inquiry* 31(2): 231–270.

Jackson, F. 1990: *Grammar and meaning*. London: Longman.

Quirk, R., S. Greenbaum, G. Leech, and J. Svartvik. 1985: *A comprehensive grammar of the English language*. London: Longman.

Traugott, E. C., A. T. Muelen, J. S. Reilly, and C. A. Ferguson (eds.). 1986: *On conditionals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wierzbicka, A. 1997: Conditionals and counterfactuals. In: A. Athanasiadou and R. Dirven (eds.), 15–59.

❖

11. **Matthew Cummins,** Research Assistant, Leipzig University, Germany
   Ambiguities in Tense Interpretation in Tyneside English

In Tyneside English (TE), it is possible to use the perfective participle as the simple past verb form, and the simple past conjugation as the perfect participle in auxiliary tenses. This is demonstrated in the examples below:

(1) <u>Tyneside English</u> (Corrigan et al. 2012)

a.   The last time I come across that road, it was going back [...] about nine years ago.
      'The last time I came across that road, it was going back [...] about nine years ago.'
                                                                                              [NECTE2]
b.   I'm hoping my horse has came in.
      'I'm hoping my horse has come in.'   [NECTE2]

Not only are the constructions in (1) syntactically and morphologically different to Standard variations of English, they also differ in their interpretations and contexts of use from the pattern attested in standard varieties of English. Similar interpretations have been documented in the German *Perfekt* (see Ballweg 1988; Zeller 1994; and Grewendorf 1995).

Work has been published investigating the phonology and morphology of this phenomenon (Beal, 2010), however, there has been little investigation into the semantics of these tenses. Beal generally understands examples like (1a) to be the equivalent of the simple past in Standard English (SE), and those like (1b) to be the equivalent of the present perfect. However, as a native speaker of this dialect, such an explanation does not seem adequate. Since both of these tenses seem to be combinations of both the perfective and simple past, there could be some overlap in terms of how these forms should be interpreted temporally.

In order to test this hypothesis, I carried out a pilot study involving 29 subjects, all of whom were native TE speakers. Of these 29, 14 were male and 15 were female. Their ages ranged from 21 to 58 years of age, the mean age of the subject set being 35 years old.

For this experiment, a forced-choice method (Erlewine and Kotek 2016) was implemented in order to retrieve a participant's semantic interpretation of the TE past tenses. Participants were given a set of 17 contexts which would either have a Standard English preterite interpretation, or a Standard English present perfect reading. The participants then chose a one of the TE constructions that best described the context.

Correlations from the preliminary data indicate that the interpretations of TE tenses are not directly comparable to those in SE. Verbs such as *sink*, *see* and *do* show that it is common for TE speakers to use a different morphological tense than in SE. Furthermore, it appears that many verbs cause a tense interpretation ambiguity only in specific contexts. Regarding the verb *do* for example, speakers will use the TE construction in a present perfect context, however they prefer to use the SE construction in a simple past context. In addition, this participle/simple past alternation is not only limited to the present perfect. The simple past form can also be used as the perfective participle in other auxiliary tenses such as the future and conditional perfect.

❖

12. Fabio Del Prete, Researcher in Natural Language Semantics, CLLE (CNRS), Toulouse, France
Imperfetto in Italian irrealis conditionals

Italian *irrealis* conditionals can have an Imperfetto (IMP) both in the protasis Φ and apodosis Ψ (Ippolito 2004), e.g. (1):

(1) Se *venivi*   alla   festa ti   *divertivi*   un sacco.
     if   come-2SG.IMP to-the party 2SG.CL amuse-2SG.IMP a lot
     'If you came/had come to the party, you would have/have had a lot of fun.'

In (1) the speaker is reasoning about the hearer's possible coming-to-the-party and ensuing amusement; the two events together can be past, present or future and are unactualized. Morphologically more complex conditionals have Congiuntivo in Φ and Condizionale in Ψ, e.g. (2)-(3):

(2) Se *venissi*   alla festa   ti *divertiresti*   un sacco.
     if come-2SG.IMPF.SUBJ to-the party amuse-2SG.PRS.COND   a lot
     'If you came to the party, you would have a lot of fun.'   ("one-past-counterfactual")

(3) Se *fossi*   *venuto*   alla festa
     if be-2SG.IMPF.SUBJ come-PST.PTCP to-the party
     ti   *saresti*   *divertito*   un sacco.
     2SG   be-2SG.PRS.COND   amuse- PST.PTCP   a lot
     'If you had come to the party, you would have had a lot of fun.' ("two-pasts-counterfactual")

I study the semantic relation between (1) and (2)-(3). To this end, I look at "mixed conditionals", in which IMP combines with Condizionale in Ψ or Congiuntivo in Φ, as crucial evidence bearing on this question. Only (4b)-(5b) are acceptable mixed conditionals, not (4a)-(5a) (featuring non-past Congiuntivo/Condizionale):

(4) a. ?Se venivi alla festa ti *divertiresti* un sacco.
     b. Se venivi alla festa ti *saresti divertito* un sacco.
(5) a. ?Se *venissi* alla festa ti divertivi un sacco.
     b. Se *fossi venuto* alla festa ti divertivi un sacco.

As temporary framework, I adopt the following assumptions, quite standard for English counterfactuals (Iatridou 2000, Ippolito 2013):
(A1) Φ,Ψ involve a "fake past" whose contribution is to take us from the actual to a possible world;
(A2) in two-pasts-counterfactuals, Φ,Ψ involve a true past below fake past and above future WOLL.

This analysis predicts that: (2) is true iff in all future worlds to the closest world in which you come after t_{now}, you have fun then; (3) is true iff in all future worlds to the closest world in which you come at a past time, you have fun then.

Turning to (4a,b)-(5a,b), this pattern would show that IMP preserves a true past in these contexts, agreeing with the true past of the past Congiuntivo/Condizionale.

I propose an account of Italian based on an analysis of IMP as PAST*+IMPERFECTIVE: IMPERFECTIVE denotes right-openness of a situation in branching time (Del Prete 2013), PAST* is an operator requiring distance of a situation from a reference-situation in temporal/modal space, which in *irrealis*-conditionals is primarily interpreted as modal distance. I inquire whether fake/true past in English two-pasts-counterfactuals can be the same operator PAST*.

References
Del Prete, Fabio (2013). Imperfectivity and Habituality in Italian. In: A. Mari, C. Beyssade, F. Del Prete (eds.), *Genericity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 222–249.

Iatridou, Sabine (2000). The Grammatical Ingredients of Counterfactuality. *Linguistic Inquiry* 31(2): 231–270.

Ippolito, Michela (2004). Imperfect Modality. In: Guéron, J., Lecarme, J. (eds.), *The Syntax of Time*. Cambridge, MIT Press, 359–387.

Ippolito, Michela (2013). *Subjunctive Conditionals: A Linguistic Analysis*. Cambridge, MIT Press.

❖

13. Liliane Hodieb, INALCO, Paris, France
A cognitive account of the role of and relationship between the hypothetical/ conditional marker and the distal/ past tense marker in Wushi

Conditional constructions in Wushi (Grassfields Bantu, Niger-Congo) are unequivocally marked by the morpheme *là* placed in the protasis. As in many languages (Traugott et al. 1986:6), there is no specific marker in the apodosis except for counterfactuals. For example:

(1) wə̀   là   dʒừ   kùŋkŭ   wə́   wō   jɛ̄   ŋə̀
      2SG HYP come tomorrow 2SG FUT see 3SG
      'If you come tomorrow you will see him.'

As seen in (1), the canonical order SVO is maintained, only with the hypothetical/conditional marker *là* appearing between the subject and the verb. We can also see that *là* glossed as HYP for "hypothetical", could also be roughly translated as 'if'. "Roughly" because when we look at other contexts where this morpheme is used, there is certainly more in its meaning and function. Indeed, *là* occurs as a modality marker with the distal marker *kə̀*, giving *làkə̀*. The sentence in (2) exemplifies such a use.

(2) là-kə̀   ŋə́   tì   dʒừ
      HYP-DST   3SG NEG come
      'She cannot come.'

The relationship between *là* and *kɜ̀* is even more challenging in that in hypothetical conditionals like the sentence in (1), *là* may be followed by *kɜ̀* in the protasis to refer to a situation in the past. In counterfactuals, the apodosis is marked by *kɜ̀dú* where *dú* is an intriguing morpheme that is not found in any other context.

(3) wɜ̀   là   (kɜ̀)   dʒǔ   ndóʔsɜ̀   wɜ̀   kɜ̀-dú   jɛ̄   ŋɜ̀
     2SG   HYP   (DST)   come   yesterday 2SG   DST-?   see   3SG
     'If you had come yesterday you would have seen him.'

I submit that from a cognitive perspective, *kɜ̀* is a malleable marker that functions as a distal marker that shifts discourse in a domain that is not the actual one or the time of speech (Botne and Kersher 2008); indeed, in some contexts, particularly in hypothetical conditionals, it is interpreted as a past tense marker. As for the hypothetical marker *là*, to use Werth's terms, what it truly does is that it "places the whole predicated situation at a distance from the deictic zero-point (Werth 1997:247). On one hand, it has been demonstrated that in many languages the past tense is involved in the expression of hypotheticality (Athanasiadou & Dirven 1997: 99, 100). On the other hand, when *kɜ̀* is analysed as a distal marker like *là* and not a tense marker strictly speaking, the co-occurrence of both morphemes in hypothetical conditionals might be seen as a rather strange redundancy. In order to solve this, I propose that the cognitive distant world or domain is structured in several compartments or spaces in such a way that each morpheme is assigned to a specific "space" within that domain, thus conveying a particular "distal" meaning in each case: (i) hypotheticality, or (ii) a general distal reference which may be interpreted either as past time or future time. Finally, I analyse the counterfactual morpheme *dú* in light of *dū* found in Babungo (Schaub 1985:228), a language very close to Wushi, where it serves as a modality marker.

References

Athanasiadou, A., Dirven, R. 1997. Conditionality, hypothetically, counterfactuality. In A. Athanasiadou & R. Dirven (eds.), *On Conditionals again*. John Benjamins Publishing Company, pp. 61-96.

Botne, R., Kershner, T. 2008. Tense and cognitive space: On the organization of tense/aspect systems in Bantu languages and beyond. *Cognitive Linguistics* 19(2), pp. 145–218.

Schaub, W. 1985. *Babungo*. Croom Helm.

Traugott, E. C., Ter Meulen, A., Rilly, J. S., Ferguson, C. A. (eds.) 1986. *On Conditionals*. Cambridge University Press.

Werth, P. 1997. Conditionality as cognitive distance. In A. Athanasiadou & R. Dirven (eds.), *On Conditionals again*. John Benjamins Publishing Company, pp. 243-271.

❖

14. **Peter Edwin Hook,** Professor Emeritus, Universities of Michigan and Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, USA
Occurrence in rebutted protases as compound verb triggers in Hindi-Urdu

Do rebuttable protases ("even if" clauses) function as compound verb triggers in Hindi-Urdu?

Although Western grammarians have been aware of the compound verb as a prominent feature of South Asian languages for over three hundred years (see Drocco 2022), it is only around the middle of the previous century that serious attempts to identify the semantic and discoursal factors conditioning its occurrence began with work by Burton-Page (1957), Paul Hacker (1958, 1961), Jelovkov (1963), V. Pořízka (1967-69), Hook (1974), Bashir (1993), Nespital (1997), Hook (2021). Progress in these attempts depended on the emergence and development of the conceptual tools necessary for analysis. Among those concepts: alternation, identification of aspect as a phenomenon distinct from tense, perfectivity versus relative perfectivity, telicity, the notion of entailment and its cancellation, the contrast of prepared versus unprepared mind, and autogeny. The present paper explores alternation in polarity embodied in rebuttable protases as a powerful promoter (or suppressor) of compound (versus non-compound) manifestation of predicates in Hindi-Urdu.

The paper investigates a discourse function that involves contrast in states of mind or information status as a trigger of compound verb (CV) manifestation. A "rebuttable protasis" is an "even-if" clause followed by an apodosis in which the inferable contents of the protasis are canceled or undercut. I use the term to designate conditional clauses that express an exception to a preceding clause's assertion, for instance [*vah vāpas nahī̃ āegī*] 'she won't come back' in (1):

(1) [vah vāpas nahī̃ ā-egī]   aur [agar ā   bhī gaī] to [tumhẽ ghās nahī̃ ḍāl-egī]
     she back NEG come-FUT and if   come too WENT then you.DAT grass NEG throw-FUT
     'She's not coming back and even if she did come back she won't give you any encouragement.'

(1) is uttered by a speaker who then rebuts what he supposes the addressee may infer from the contents of the protasis.

In elevated discourse, Hindi-Urdu allows "daisy chains" of rebuttable protases whose apodoses feed into further protases, a ladder of propositions, each one an exception to the previous, each one contradicted by the next. In these highly contrastive environments compound manifestation of predicates in protases is categorical:

(2a) sansār-mẽ pratham to   vairāgy   ho-nā kaṭhin hai.
      world-in first   then dispassionate be-INF difficult is (initial premise of the daisy chain)
      'To begin with, to be dispassionate in this world is difficult.'

(2b) yadi vairāgy   ho   bhī gayā to   karm.kāṇḍ.kā čhūt-nā kaṭhin hai.
      if   dispassion become too WENT then ritual's   escape difficult is
      'Even if one achieves dispassion, it's difficult to give up ritual.'

(2c) yadi karm kāṇḍ-se   čhūt.kārā mil   gayā   to
     if   ritual-from escape   achieve WENT then
     kām-krodh-ādi-se   čhūt-kar   daivī sampatti prāpt kar-nā kaṭhin hai.
     lust-anger-etc-from escape-GER divine wealth   acquire-INF difficult is
     'Even if one transcends rituals, still it's difficult by getting rid of lust and anger to get divine
     wealth.'

(2d) yadi daivī sampatti bhī ā   gaī   to   bhī sad-guru mil-nā kaṭhin hai.
     if   divine wealth   too come WENT then too true-guru get-INF difficult is
     'Even if divine wealth comes, it's difficult to find a master.'

(2e) yadi sad-guru bhī mil jāy to   bhī un.ke vāky-mẽ šraddhā
     if   true-guru too find GO then too his   words-in faith
     ho-kar   gyān   ho-nā   kaṭhin   hai.
     become-GER knowledge become-INF difficult is
     'Even if a true master is found, still it's difficult to attain knowledge (just) by believing in
     his words.'

(2f) yadi gyān   bhī ho jāy   to   bhī čitta.vrtti-kā sthir   rah-nā kaṭhin hai
     if   knowledge too become GO then too mind-GEN   stable stay-INF difficult is
     'Even if one attains knowledge, it's difficult for the mind to remain stable.'

Worth noting in (2) is the free variation in mood: indicative *vairāgy ho bhī gayā* in (2b) and
čhūt.kārā mil gayā in (2c) versus subjunctive *sad-guru bhī mil jāy* in (2e) and *gyān bhī ho jāy* in (2f)
suggesting that neither of these two normally contrasting moods may be relevant to our
understanding conditionals!

Data sources
(1') [page 67 of Prakash Bharati's परफेक्ट क्राइम ("Perfect Crime")]
(2') [m.facebook.com/bgsmvidisha/photos/a.507976842682710/1790010707812644/ ...]

❖

15. **Ainur Kakimova,** University of Verona, Italy & University of Warsaw, Poland
   The morphosyntax of X-marking in Kazakh, Russian and Polish languages

The focus of the proposed presentation is the morphosyntactic make-up that distinguishes
counterfactual conditionals from indicative ones. According to the recent proposal of X-marking
theory (von Fintel & Iatridou, 2022), we can distinguish two types of morphosyntax: O-marking
(O means ordinary) and X-marking (X means eXtra). O-marking is used for epistemically open
scenarios, whereas X-marking is applied for counterfactuals. The authors of the X-marking theory
acknowledge that much work remains to be done including the analysis of the morphological
composition of X in various languages. The proposed presentation addresses the issue of the
morphosyntactic make-up of X in less studied languages (i.e., Kazakh, Russian and Polish). It aims
to answer what morphosyntax these three languages use for X-marking in conditionals. The

secondary question concerns the similarities between X-marked conditionals and desires (wish sentences). Morphosyntactic analysis is used as a research method. The results of the analysis suggest that the morphology of X in all three languages contains the fake past tense. In Kazakh, it can be sufficient to use such morphology to receive counterfactual meaning. For example, compare the following O-marking (1a) and X-marking (1b):

(1a) Kazakh
Eger Marijam žauap-ty bil-se, Sara da žauap-ty bil-er.
if Mary answer-ACC know-COND.3SG Sara too answer-ACC know-FUT.3SG
'If Mary knows the answer, Sara knows the answer.'

(1b) Kazakh
Eger Marijam žauap-ty bil-se, Sara da žauap-ty bil-er e-di.
if Mary answer-ACC know-COND.3SG Sara too answer-ACC know-FUT.3SG e.AUX-PST
'If Mary knew the answer, Sara would know the answer.'

However, the fake past tense alone is not enough for conveying counterfactuality in Slavic languages: we also need to use the subjunctive *by*. In Kazakh counterfactual conditionals, X-marking is implemented in the consequent, whereas in Slavic languages it is observed also in the antecedent. For instance, compare the following Russian (2) and Polish (3) O-marking (a) and X-marking (b):

(2a) Russian
Esli Marija zna-et otvet, to Sara zna-et otvet.
if Mary know-PRS.3SG answer.ACC then Sara know-PRS.3SG answer.ACC
'If Mary knows the answer, Sara knows the answer.'

(2b) Russian
Esli Marija zna-l-a by otvet, to Sara zna-l-a by otvet.
if Mary know-PST-3FSG by answer.ACC then Sara know-PST-3FSG by answer.ACC
'If Mary knew the answer, Sara would know the answer.'

(3a) Polish
Jeśli Maria zna odpowiedź, to Sara zna odpowiedź.
if Mary know.PRS.3SG answer.ACC then Sara know.PRS.3SG answer.ACC
'If Mary knows the answer, Sara knows the answer.'

(3b) Polish
Gdy-by Maria zna-ł-a odpowiedź, to-by Sara zna-ł-a odpowiedź.
if-BY Mary know-PST-3FSG answer.ACC then-BY Sara know-PST-3FSG answer.ACC
'If Mary knew the answer, Sara would know the answer.'

The morphological components of X in conditionals and desires resemble. In sum, notwithstanding some discrepancies in the morphosyntax of X-marking, all three languages use an X-marker and fake past tense that give rise to counterfactual meaning. Thus, the prospective presentation on the cross-linguistic analysis of X contributes to the unified theory of X-marking.

❖

16. Hadil Karawani (University of Konstanz) and **Chris H. Reintges** (CNRS/ LLF/ University Paris Cité)
The Coptic Conditional Conjugation as a Certainty Conditional

§1. THE ISSUE. Coptic [Afroasiatic, 3rd–12th c. CE] stands out cross-linguistically in having a specialized verb conjugation that is restricted to the protasis clause of a conditional sentence. The Conditional conjugation **e = f ʃan soːtəm** 'if/when he hears' is formed with an initial relativizer **e-/ere** and a morphologically invariant conjugation base **ʃan**. The Conditional conjugation has modal as well as temporal readings that are often difficult to tease apart. This led to the contention that the Conditional marker **ʃan** is semantically ambiguous and it needs to be disambiguated by clausal conjunctions (Layton 2000: 272–273 §346). But polysemy does not entail that the form in question is semantically ambiguous. We propose a unified account of the **e = f ʃan** conjugation pattern as a CERTAINTY conditional that unifies its multifaceted meanings (see also Kaufmann 2005).

§2. IN CONSTRUCTION WITH APODOTIC FUTURE TENSE. The Conditional frequently combines with the epistemic future tense marker **na** in the apodosis clause. In (1) the speaker (Jesus Christ) instructs his addressee (Emperor Constantine's sister Eudoxia) to find the Holy Sepulchre. The actualization of the expedition to Jerusalem in the immediate future is therefore beyond doubt.

(1)   Main clause **e = f ʃan** Conditional in protasis, epistemic future tense **na** in apodosis
      er   **ʃan**   βok   ehraï   e–tə–Hieruːsalɛm   (…)
      REL.2F.SG   COND   go.ABS   PCL   to–DEF.F.SG–Jerusalem
      se =   **na**   tsaβɔː   erɔ = f   ənkji   n–eβɔl
      CL.3PL =   EPIS.FUT teach.CS(= CL2F.SG) about = CL.3M.SG FOC   DEF.PL–out
      hən   ta–pylɛː   (…)
      from   DEF.F.SG.POSS.1SG–tribe
      'If/when you go to Jerusalem (…), those from my tribe will teach you about it (the tomb) (…)' (Eudoxia 58: 23–26 §56, ed. Orlandi)

In (2) the conditional sentence is embedded under the BELIEVE verb **pisteue**. BELIEVE verbs are known to entail the truth of the embedded proposition. The epistemic future **na** occurs in the apodosis of the embedded conditional, which thus goes hand in hand with the certainty reading associated with the matrix BELIEVE verb. The certainty is about the spiritual benefits occasioned by the potential visit of the venerable monk.

(2)   Embedded **e = f ʃan** Conditional in protasis, epistemic future tense **na** in apodosis
      awoː ti =   pisteue   [tʲe   **e**   = f   **ʃan** eï   ʃarɔ = n
      and   CL.1SG = believe.ABS   COMP REL = CL.3M.SG COND come.ABS to = CL.1PL
      tən =   **na** kЈen   hɛu̯   tɛr = ən   hitən   ne = f–ʃlɛl]
      CL.1PL =   FUT   find.ABS gain   tall = POSS.1PL   through DEF.PL = POSS.3PL–prayer
      'And I believe that if/when he (the venerable monk) comes, we will all profit from his prayers.' (Hilaria 10:30–31, ed. Drescher)

The modal "IF" reading of the Conditional can be strengthened at the expense of the temporal "WHEN" reading (Declerck 1997). This happens in the context of negation. In (3) the **e = f ʃan** conjugation is negated by the negative auxiliary **təm** 'to do not'. The epistemic future **na**, on the other hand, is negated by means of the bipartite negation **nə … ʔan**. The apodosis clause is further modalized by the ability modal auxiliary **əʃ** 'to be able to, can'.

(3) Conditional sentence with negated **e = f ʃan** Conditional in protasis, negated future tense in apodosis

er	**ʃan**	**təm**	pə–roːme	apotasse	ən–enka	nim
REL	COND	NEG.AUX	DEF.M.SG–man	give_up.ABS	PREP–thing	each.M.SG

[RCᵉᵗ	—	həm	pə–kosmos]
REL		in	DEF.M.SG–world.M.SG.NOM

nə	**= f**	**na**	ʃ	ʃoːpe	**ʔan**	əm	monakhos
NEG1	= CL.3M.SG	FUT	CAN	become.ABS	NEG2	as	monk.M.SG.NOM

'If a man will not give up everything that is in the world, he won't be able to become a monk.' (Apophtegmata Patrum nr. 242, 74: 28–29, ed. Chaîne)

The presence of negation in the apodosis automatically excludes a non-modal temporal interpretation of the conditional sentence construction as a whole. We will also discuss deontic and imperative environments that favor the modal reading.

§3. IN CONSTRUCTION WITH APODOTIC HABITUAL ASPECT. The Conditional is very common with the pluractional aspect marker **ʃa/ʃare** in the apodosis. Pluractional aspect indicates iterative, distributive or habitual action and thus involves minimally two occurrences of the same event (Reintges 2018 [2004]: 276–8 §7.3.6.2). This is an apodotic environment that strengthens the temporal reading at the expense of the modal one. In (4) the apodosis contains both the pluractional aspect marker **ʃa =** and the preterit past tense marker **ne**.

(4) Main clause **e = f ʃan** Conditional in protasis, past pluractional **ne ʃa =** in apodosis

e	= s	ʃan	toːwən	e–ʃlεl	ne	ʃa	= s	ʃlεl
REL	= CL.3F.SG	COND	raise.ABS	to–pray.ABS	PRET	HAB	= CL.3F.SG	pray.ABS

nəmma = s
with = CL.3F.SG

'When(ever) she (Hilaria) rose to pray, he used to pray with her (sister).' (Hilaria 9: 12, ed. Drescher)

The compound preterit pluractional tense **ne ʃa = s ʃlεl** 'she used to pray' **ne ʃa = s ʃlεl** 'she used to pray' event pattern (early morning prayer) no longer holds at utterance time.

§4. OUTLOOK. The Coptic **e = f ʃan** Conditional has modal and temporal readings. At first, it looks as if one must resort to contextual information must be appealed to tear the two readings apart. On closer inspection, it appears, however, that the interpretative properties are predictable

from the tense, aspect and polarity specification of the apodosis. Accordingly, the conjugation base ʃan is not semantically ambiguous, as the traditional analysis would have it.

References

Declerck, Renaat H. C. (1997) *When-Clauses and Temporal Structure*. 1st edition. Routledge: London

Layton, Bentley (2000) *A Coptic Grammar with Chrestomathy and Glossary: Sahidic Dialect* [Porta Linguarum Orientalium 20]. Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag

Kaufmann, Stefan (2005) "Conditional Truth and Future Reference." *Journal of Semantics* 22(3): 231-280.

Reintges, Chris H. *(2018 [2004]) Coptic Egyptian (Sahidic Dialect): A Learner's Grammar* [Africanist Study books 15]. 2nd revised edition. Cologne: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag.

❖

17. Ezra La Roi, FWO PhD researcher Ancient, Greek Linguistics, Ghent University
The life cycles of counterfactual conditionals in Ancient Greek: aspect, actionality and temporal reference

In this paper, I investigate the diachronic role played by aspect and actionality in the diachronic development of counterfactual conditionals. In counterfactual conditionals in Archaic Greek (VIII-VI BCE), we find both a counterfactual optative mood (inherited from Proto-Indo-European, Brugmann 1930, 586) and an innovative counterfactual indicative mood which eventually replaces it (Wakker 1994, 205–214; Allan 2013) in Classical Greek (V BCE – IV BCE). Also, the temporal reference range of these constructions changed over time. For example, the counterfactual indicative was limited to past counterfactuality in Archaic Greek, but it extended its temporal reference to the non-past in Classical Greek, thereby following the predictions of the life cycles of counterfactuals (Dahl 1997). As a result, both tense and aspect could be said to become 'fake' (Iatridou 2000; Karawani 2014). Based on a corpus analysis of counterfactual conditionals in Archaic Greek (111 occurrences) and Classical Greek (641 occurrences), I address two specific research questions that are related to the temporal reference extension and replacement: (1) what is the role of the perfective ('aorist') versus the imperfective ('imperfect') aspect in the temporal reference extension of the counterfactual mood? (2) what is the role of the actionality of the state of affairs in its clausal context?

References

Allan, R. J. 2013. Exploring Modality's Semantic Space: Grammaticalization, Subjectification and the case of ὀφείλω. *Glotta* 89: 1–46.

Brugmann, K. 1930. *Kurze vergleichende Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen : auf Grund des fünfbändigen Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen von K. Brugmann und B. Delbrück verfasst.* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Dahl, Ö. 1997. The relation between past time reference and counterfactuality: A new look. In *On Conditionals Again*, ed. E. C. Traugott, A. Ter Meulen, J. S. Reilly, and C. A. Ferguson, 97–114. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Iatridou, S. 2000. The Grammatical Ingredients of Counterfactuality. *Linguistic Inquiry* 31: 231–270.

Karawani, H. 2014. *The real, the fake, and the fake fake in counterfactual conditionals, crosslinguistically.* Utrecht: LOT.

Wakker, G. C. 1994. *Conditions and conditionals : an investigation of ancient Greek.* Amsterdam: Gieben.

❖

18. Enzo Laurenti, Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, Paris
Conditionals, desires and conditional desires in French

In French, the morphological pattern found in counterfactual conditionals is composed by the association of "*imparfait*" (imperfective past tense) in the antecedent and the so-called "*conditionnel*" in the consequent.

(1)   Si Sam est / était.IMPF le coupable, il y a / aurait.COND du sang sur la corde.
       If Sam is / were guilty, there is / would be blood on the rope.

A new terminology has recently been introduced by von Fintel and Iatridou (2022), who refer to this pattern as X-marking. One of the motivations behind this new label is to account for cases where this morphology is used outside of obvious conditional utterances. For example, many languages do not have a lexical counterpart of English 'ought', and instead use an inflected modal. This is the case in French, where we find the strong modal *devoir* with the *conditionnel* flexion. Another recurring pattern is the association of the same *conditionnel* with *vouloir* ('want') to express, according to vF&I, roughly the same thing as English 'wish'.

        One of the most interesting aspects of expressions like *devrais* or *voudrais* is their actuality. Despite their mobilization of "counterfactual morphology", they are very often used in order to describe states of affair (here, obligations or desires, respectively) that hold in the actual world. Focusing on attitude reports and ascriptions, it is easy to see that this property of actuality is not homogeneously present among predicates: *croire* ('believe') with the *conditionnel* seems to systematically describe an attitude which is not held in the actual world, but rather in non-actual worlds.

(2)   Sam goes to Paris for the first time. When she sees the Montparnasse Tower, she says:
       a. Je voudrais être à New-York. – *Lit.*: "I would want to be in New-York."
       → Desiderative attitude in the actual world.
       b. Je croirais être à New-York. – *Lit.*: "I would believe I am in New-York."
       → No doxastic attitude in the actual world.

Our goal is to offer an analysis capable to derive the specificity of X-marked desire reports without presupposing a monolithic lexicalisation. We will rather postulates that it comes from the composition of the lexical entry of the predicate modified and conditional X-marking. In order to do so, we first describe the empirical properties of *voudrais*, and how it contrasts with both bare indicative *vouloir* and X-marked belief reports. Attested uses in corpora and patterns manifested in various semantical tests (inferential patterns, behavior of presupposition, …) seem to indicate that the contribution of consequent X-marking might go beyond the widening of the modal base vF&I advocates for. Then, we sketch a Kratzerian account of X-marked attitude reports that treats them as counterfactual whose antecedent is covert. We characterize the content of this hidden restrictor as targeting worlds where the specific conditions for the satisfaction of the attitude are met: evidences for doxastics, possibility to attain the prejacent in the case of *vouloir*. This asymmetry finally allows us to account for most of our data, including the actuality puzzle.

References

Arregui, A. (2007). When aspect matters: The case of would-conditionals. *Natural Language Semantics*, *15*(3), 221–264. https://doi.org/10/dvc25c

Blumberg, K., & Holguín, B. (2019). Embedded Attitudes. *Journal of Semantics*, *36*(3), 377–406. https://doi.org/10/gqmtzr

Caudal, P. (2018). Vers une approche constructionnelle des structures au conditionnel. *Langue française*, *200*(4), 49–61. https://doi.org/10/gqhfk8

de Saussure, L. (2018). L'énigme de devoir au conditionnel passé. *Langue française*, *200*(4), 121–133. https://doi.org/10/gqhfk7

von Fintel, K., & Iatridou, S. (2022). Prolegomena to a theory of X-marking. Unpublished manuscript, MIT. https://lingbuzz.net/lingbuzz/005290

Foullioux, C., & De Felipe, D. T. (2004). À propos du mode et de l'atténuation. *Langue Française*, *142*, 112–126.

Iatridou, S. (2000). The grammatical ingredients of counterfactuality. *Linguistic inquiry*, *31*(2), 231-270.

Ippolito, M. (2003). Presuppositions and Implicatures in Counterfactuals. *Natural Language Semantics*, *11*(2), 145–186. https://doi.org/10/d6zh3r

Kaufmann, M., & Kaufmann, S. (2022). Iffy Endorsements. *Journal of Semantics*, *38*(4), 639–665. https://doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffab017

Kaufmann, S. (2005). Conditional Truth and Future Reference. *Journal of Semantics*, *22*(3), 231–280. https://doi.org/10/cnrswj

Kratzer, A. (2005). Constraining Premise Sets for Counterfactuals. *Journal of Semantics*, *22*(2), 153–158. https://doi.org/10/dx4jrf

Kratzer, A. (1991). Conditionals. In A. Stechow and D. Wunderlich (eds.) *Semantics: An International Handbook of Contemporary Research*, 651– 656. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Lanly, A. (2002). Plaidoyer pour le conditionnel en -rais. *L'information grammaticale*, *95*(1), 20–22. https://doi.org/10/gqhfqk

Lewis, D. (1979). Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow. *Noûs*, *13*(4), 455–476. https://doi.org/10/btr859

Patard, A., & De Mulder, W. (2012). L'évolution des usages du conditionnel en français. *Faits de Langues*, *40*(2), 29–36. https://doi.org/10.3726/431382_29

Tiskin, D. (2016). Conditional attitude ascription. *Epistemology & Philosophy of Science*, *50*(4), 74–93. https://doi.org/10/f3tgh2

❖

19. **Alda Mari,** IJN, ENS, Paris
Conditional offers in English (Joint work with Enzo Laurenti and Marta Abrusan)

The use of the modal *can* in statements like (1) has received little if no attention in the literature. In spite of some resemblances, we show that we are not dealing with an ability ascription, nor with a subtype of teleological conditionals like *anankastics* or *eparkastics* (von Fintel and Iatridou (2005); Nissenbaum (2005); Sæbø (2001), among others).

(1)   I can do the dishes (if you want).

We propose that the modal *can* in (1) is the existential counterpart of universal future *will* and that the whole utterance is a Conditional Offer (CO). To utter (1) is, for the speaker, to offer to the addressee the authority on the outcome regarding a specific matter. We show that these conditional offers are relativized to a subject matter (SM). Our account extends to 'Can you pass

me the salt?' type of questions, for which it provides a novel semantic account arguing that the authority parameter can be shifted in questions, in a way parallel to the individual parameter of evidentials giving rise to the interrogative flip.

<div align="center">❖</div>

20. Laura Merino Hernández, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin
Inventory and Prototipicality of Conditional Constructions in Spanish

Introduction: Cross-linguistically speakers use a wide variety of morphosyntactic structures to express conditionality including juxtaposition, nonfinite protases, and subordination (e.g., Elder 2019; Montolío 1999). Furthermore, conditional constructions (CCs) intersect with other types of constructions such as temporal, causal, and habitual clauses (e.g., Kortmann 1997; Rodríguez Rosique 2008). The purpose of this talk is twofold. First, I present an empirically based inventory of CCs in Spanish. Second, I propose a unified account of conditionality that can be better understood as a gradable phenomenon, where the prototipicality of CCs depends on their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic characteristics.

Methodology: The data comes from 32 speakers of Mexican Spanish who were presented with an opinion interview and a contextualized-situations task designed to elicit CCs. Based on previous research (e.g., Sweetser 1990; Elder 2019) a CC had to: (a) have a protasis and an apodosis implicitly or explicitly realized, (b) the protasis was a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for the realization of the apodosis, (c) the antecedent was uncertain (not known to be true) by the speaker, and (d) the construction could be replaced by an *if*-clause (regardless of tense-mood shift) and still retain a conditional meaning.

Inventory of CCs

A total of 977 CCs were identified, divided into 35 types, and grouped into three major categories: overt connectives ([1], 43% N = 418), elliptical ([2], 34% N = 337), and juxtaposition ([3], 23% N = 222). There were 15 overt connectives some of whose primary meaning was not conditional like *cuando* 'when' (see Figure 1), but which could yield a conditional interpretation via the manipulation of tense, aspect, and mood. Elliptical CCs take what was said in the previous discourse, by the speaker or by their interlocutor, as the antecedent. For instance, the only difference in the answers in (2) is the overt *if*-clause. Finally, juxtaposed CCs did not present any formal syntactic marker that indicated any semantic relation (3), rather, they had two adjacent clauses or phrases whose conditional meaning arised through a conversational implicature (see Figure 2 for the list of 20 structures that could serve as protases of CCs).

Prototipicality Scale

Regarding the syntactic characteristics of CCs, those with an overt connective were considered more prototypical, followed by juxtaposed and elliptical CCs (horizontal axis in Figure 3). Then, constructions were categorized according to the type of inferences that were needed to arrive at a conditional interpretation. Constructions that convey uncertainty in their semantics were considered more prototypical as no inference is needed to arrive at the desired meaning. Then, we have CCs that arose through a GCI: (a) connectives whose primary meaning is that of conditionality and (b) those connectives whose primary interpretations are other meanings like

temporality or causality. Furthermore, we had CCs in which conditionality was inferred through PCIs: (a) those that have two clauses with two verbs and (b) those whose antecedent was any other type of phrase like a noun or a prepositional phrase. Lastly, we have elliptical protases that are the least prototypical type of CC.

References

Elder, Chi-Hé. 2019. *Context, cognition and conditionals*. Switzerland: Springer.

Kortmann, Bernd. 1997. *Adverbial subordination: A typology and history of adverbial subordinators based on European languages*. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Montolío Durán, Estrella. 1999. Las construcciones condicionales. *Gramática descriptiva de la lengua española*, eds. Ignacio Bosque and Violeta. Demonte, 3643-738. Madrid: Espasa Calpe.

Rodríguez Rosique, Susana. 2008. *Pragmática y Gramática: Condicionales concesivas en español*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Examples and Figures

(1)   …no sé pagaría a alguien y [*en dado caso que* no consiga a nadie]$_{PROT}$ [pues sí ya dejaría que se mueran] (41AP27H)

'…I don't know I would pay someone and [*in given case that* I don't get anybody [well yes I would let them die]$_{APOD}$'

(2)   You can change one thing about your past, what do you change?

a)   [yo *si* pudiera]$_{PROT}$ [sí cambiaría muchas cosas]$_{APOD}$ pero pues igual de todo se aprende

'[*If* I could]$_{PROT}$ [yes I would change many things]$_{APOD}$ but well one learns from everything'

b)   [*elliptical*]$_{PROT}$ [pues sí cambiaría una que otra cosita]$_{APOD}$ pero muy personal

'[*elliptical*]$_{PROT}$ [well   yes I would change one thing here and there]$_{APOD}$ but very personal'

(3)   What do you think about the legalization of drugs?

quizás estoy de acuerdo en unos tipos de drogas pero creo como por ejemplo [*la marihuana*]$_{PROT}$ [estoy de acuerdo]$_{APOD}$ porque siento que habría muchos cambios en cuanto a los narcotraficantes… (41AP27H)

'maybe I agree in some type of drugs but I think that like for example [*marihuana*]$_{PROT}$ [I agree]$_{APOD}$ because I feel that there would be a lot of changes regarding drug dealers…'

Figure 1. Overt Conditional Connectives

Figure 2. Juxtaposed Conditional Connectives

	Overt Connectives	Juxtaposition	Ellipsis
More Prototypical			Less Prototypical
Semantic	*suponer* 'to suppose' | *imaginar* 'to imagine'		
GCIs			
uncertainty	*en* (det) (adj) *caso* (*de*) (*que*) 'in case that' | *si* 'if'		
uncertainty + necessary condition	*al menos que* 'unless' | *solo si* 'only if' | *siempre y cuando* 'as long as' | *siempre que* 'so long as'		
uncertainty + lexical material	*si no* 'if not' | *si acaso* 'if anything' | *en dado caso* 'in such/given case'		
uncertainty (+ temporal or clausal implication: always ambiguous)	*ya que* 'given that' | *como* 'as' | *y* 'and' | *mientras* 'while' | *cuando* 'when'		
PCIs			
condition + uncertainty		gerund | infinitive | prepositional phrases | *conforme* | paratactic clauses | *que* 'that' + subjunctive | *el* (*hecho*) *que* 'the (fact) that' + subjunctive	
condition + uncertainty + lexical material		*de esa manera* 'in that way' | noun phrases | demonstrative pronouns | adjectives | adverbs in -mente 'ly'	
Less Prototypical			elliptical

Figure 3. Prototypicality of conditional constructions in Mexican Spanish. *GCI = generalized conversational implicature, PCI = particularized conversational implicature.

❖

21. **Zahra Mirrazi**, University of Massachusetts & UCLA, Los Angeles, USA
Presuppositions of Tense and Strength of Counterfactuality

Like English and many other languages, antecedents of X-marked conditionals in Farsi appears with past tense morphology. The antecedent falsity inference associated with Farsi X-marked conditionals, however, is not as easily cancellable. They are infelicitous in classic cases in which the falsity of antecedent is not implied (Future less vivid (Iatridou 2000; von Fintel & Iatridou 2020) as in (1), Anderson-type example (Anderson 1951) as in (2), Stanley Peter's case von Fintel (1998)).

(1) *The result of DV-lottery will be announced tomorrow.*
    a. #agar latary ro   mi-bord-am,   green card mi-gereft-am
        if   lottery ra   IMPF-win-PST-1SG green card IMPF-get.PST-1SG
        'If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.'
    b. agar latary ro   be-bar-am,   green card mi-gir-∅-am
        if   lottery ra   IMPF-win-∅-1SG green card IMPF-get.PRES-1SG
        'If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.'

(2) agar bimar sorxak gerefte bud,   daghighan in   alayem-I
    if   patient measles get-PP AUX.PST.3SG exactly   this symptoms-indf
    ke   alan neshan mi-dah-∅-ad   ra neshan mi-daad.
    that now   show   IMPF-give-PRES-3.SG ra show   IMPF-give-PST-3.SG
    'If the patient had the measles, he would have shown exactly the symptoms he shows now.
    #We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles.
     But we know that he doesn't have the measles.

The antecedent falsity, however, is not hardwired into semantics of Farsi X-marked conditionals. Farsi X-marked conditionals can be used to conduct a modus tollens argument. Moreover, there are cases where they do not imply falsity of their antecedent, but these are not the same cases that are familiar from the literature on English X-marked conditionals.

(3) *Context: I ask Rodica why she went to the store yesterday and not any other day.*
    (chon)   agar dirooz   mi-raf-t-am,   taxfif   mi-gereft-am.
    (because) if   yesterday IMPF-go-PST-1SG discount IMPF-get.PST-1SG
    'Because, if I went yesterday, I would get a discount.'

The current theories of X-marking, as they stand now, are not equipped with tools to account for cross-linguistic variations in the strength of antecedent falsity inference. Thus, the pattern of Farsi X-marked conditionals raises new challenges for the already difficult task of formulating the semantic contribution of past tense in X-marking. I provide novel arguments in favor of the view that both tense and aspect in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals contribute their typical semantic contribution (reiterating the position of Arregui (2005, 2007, 2009)). I ground my arguments on two main empirical observations from Farsi: (i) X-marked conditionals with only

one instance of past tense morphology can simultaneously express counterfactuality and pastness of their antecedent.

(4)   *Due to Covid-related travel restrictions, John couldn't attend Sara's birthday in Italy yesterday.*
    a. agar John dirooz   mi-raf-t   italia, Sara xošhal mi-šod
        If   John yesterday IMPF-go-PST.3SG Italy Sara happy   IMPF-become-PST.3SG
        'If John had gone to Italy yesterday, Sara would have been happy.'
    b. agar John dirooz   rafte bud   italia, Sara xošhal mi-šod
        if   John yesterday go-PP AUX-PST.3SG Italy Sara happy IMPF-become-PST.3SG
        'If John had gone to Italy yesterday, Sara would have been happy.'

(ii) Aspectual restrictions that are held outside of conditional environments are also held in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals. One such restriction which is illustrated below is the incompatibility of the stative verb *know* with perfect aspect.

(5)   a. agar Ava javaab ro mi-dunes-t,   barande-ye mosabeghe mi-šod.
        if   Ava answer ra IMPF-know-PST-3SG winner-ez competition IMPF-become.PST-3SG
        'If Ava knew the answer, she would win/have won the competition.'
    b. *agar Ava javaab ro daneste bud,   barande-ye mosabeghe mi-šod.
        if   Ava answer ra know-PP AUX-PST-3SG winner-ez competition IMPF-become.PST-3SG
        'If Ava had known the answer, she would have won the competition.'

I advance a uniform past approach that can derive the interpretation of X-marked conditionals from the contribution of past tense to determining the domain of quantification (*à la t*he Stalnakerian insight), while keeping a unified semantics for past tense morphology. I will argue for a version of Arregui's account of X-marked conditionals that is coupled with an accompanying account of O-marked conditionals (a.*k.a., indicative conditionals)* in Anchor Semantics (Kratzer 2020). According to this proposal, the structure of modals and conditionals contains a situation variable from which possibilities project (anchor situation). The role of this situation is to '*anchor the interpretation of conditionals on particular actual world facts' (*Arregui 2020). Past tense in the structure of X-marked modals and conditionals specifies the temporal location of the anchor situation.

    I posit that the semantic contribution of past tense in X-marked conditionals is the same across-languages. However, properties of tense associated with the temporal location of antecedents can affect felicity conditions of X-marked conditionals in a language. I provide evidence showing that antecedents of Farsi X-marked conditionals contain indexical tense which I independently argue comes with settledness presupposition. Due to this settledness presupposition, Farsi conditionals with indexical tenses in their antecedent are only felicitous in contexts where truth or falsity of their antecedent is settled in the projected context set (in the sense of Farkas & Bruce (2010)). Antecedents of English X-marked conditionals do not carry any presupposition, and thus are felicitous in agnostic contexts.

❖

22. **Teruyuki Mizuno**, Doctoral Candidate, University of Connecticut, Department of Linguistics, USA
Strategies for Anderson conditionals: their implications to the typology of O- and X-markings

Many, perhaps all, human languages have some grammatical apparatus to distinguish the 'actual' context from 'non-actual' contexts. 'O-' and 'X-'markings have recently been proposed as labels for such grammatical ingredients, the former for the actual and the latter for the non-actual (von Fintel and Iatridou 2022). The semantic distinction between O- and X-markings, especially that observed in conditionals, has been actively debated in both linguistics and philosophy. Although the debate has long centered around English, recent literature has seen growing attention to O- and X-markings in hitherto understudied languages, urging us to find potential cross-linguistic diversity and generality in this grammatical domain (see e.g., Karawani 2014).

In this talk, I discuss a point of variation among languages with respect to the contribution of O- and X-markings in so-called 'Anderson conditionals' (Anderson 1951). Anderson conditionals are generally formalized as those conditionals in which the antecedent is an explanans for an observed fact described by the consequent, as shown in (1a). In English, Anderson conditionals carry X-markings (i.e., an additional layer of Past), suggesting that the context is shifted to a non-actual one. However, as is well-known, they can be used to argue for the truth of the antecedent, as supported by the felicitous follow-up in (1b).

(1a) *If Jones <u>had taken</u> arsenic, he <u>would have</u> shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact shows.*
(1b) *So, it is likely that he took arsenic.*

It has often been assumed that the role of the X-markings in Anderson conditionals is to make the domain 'diverse' for the consequent, i.e., to make the domain include both worlds at which the consequent is true and those at which it is false (von Fintel 1998; a.o.). With O-markings, the conditional is evaluated against the actual context, and the sentence ends up trivially true since the truth of the consequent is entailed by the actual context. (2) is therefore judged to be infelicitous.

(2) *#If Jones took arsenic, he shows just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show.*

Now here is the puzzle: In Japanese, which is known to use Past tense as an X-marking (Ogihara 2014; Mizuno and Kaufmann 2018), the use of Past is *not* allowed in corresponding Anderson conditionals. The entire sequence in (3) is only felicitous with Non-Past, i.e., an O-marking.

(3a) *Tasikani,   kare-ga   sakuya   hiso-o   nom-eba,   kare-ga   ima   mise-tei-ru*
      it's.true   he-NOM   last.night   arsenic-ACC   drink-COND   he-NOM   now   show-ASP-NPST
      syoozyoo-to   mattaku   onazi   syoozyoo-o   ima   mise-{ru / #ta}   hazuda.
      symptom-as   exactly   same   symptom-ACC   now   show-NPST / PAST   MODAL

(3b) *Soosuruto,*   *kare-wa*   *hontooni* *hiso-o*   *non-da*   *no*   *daroo.*
     then   he-NOM   really   arsenic-ACC drink-PAST FIN MODAL

Why do English and Japanese differ in this way? What does this discrepancy tell us about the typology of O- and X-markings? I will dig into these issues by pointing to the internal systems of O- and X-markings in English and Japanese.

❖

23. **Miki Nishioka**, Osaka University & Ranjana Narsimhan, University of Delhi
A Comparative Study of Conditional Sentences in Hindi and Japanese

This paper examines the characteristics of Hindi and Japanese verb forms and the aspects, tenses, and moods associated with them, based on Hindi complex sentences with conditional or hypothetical sentences, as well as their Japanese translations. Although there are countless studies on aspects, tenses, and moods in Hindi and Japanese, we have compiled the following tables of verb forms that can be used in conditional or hypothetical clauses or sentences, based on Comrie (1976), Masica (1991) and Deo (2007) for Hindi and Tokieda (2005) and Mikami (2007) for Japanese. In Hindi, finite verb forms in Table 1 and Table 2 used in indicative sentences are freely used in conditional and hypothetical clauses. In Japanese, however, there are verb forms that are exclusive to conditional and hypothetical clauses as in Table 3.[1]

Table 1 Simple forms (finite) 'to see, to look'

Aspect	Japanese	Tense/Mood	Hindi	Tense/Mood
Imperfective	--	--	dekh-ū̃/e/ẽ/o	Potential[2] (PTN)
Imperfective	mi-ru mi-you	Non-Past (NPST) =Future	dekh- ū̃/e/ẽ/o+gā/ge/gī	Future
Imperfective	mi-ru	Non-Past =Present	dekh-tā/-te/-tī	Counterfactual
Perfective	mi-ta	Past	dekh-ā/-e/-ī	Past

Table 2 Compound forms (finite)

Aspect1	Japanese	Aspect2	Hindi	Aspect2
Imperfective	mi-te+AUX	habitual, generic	dekh-tā/-te/-tī+COP	habitual, generic
Perfective		resultative	dekh-ā/-e/-ī + COP	resultative

---

[1] Therefore, the "moshi" at the beginning of the sentence is optional.
[2] Some scholars of South Asian languages call it subjunctive, conjunctive, or contingent future.

Table 3 Conditional/hypothetical forms

Aspect1	Japanese	meanings
Imperfective	mi-re-ba	conditional/hypothetical, counterfactual with *noni*
Imperfective	mi-ru-to	habitual, generic, conditional etc. counterfactual with *noni*
Imperfective	mi-ru-na-ra(-ba[3])	(implying 'If the event, 'miru' is true, then…)
Perfective	mi-ta-ra(-ba)	Conditional/hypothetical, counterfactual with *noni*

The main findings of this paper are:

(1) Hindi allows all finite verb forms used in the indicative mood to be used in conditional and hypothetical clauses.

(2) Japanese translations usually use the conditional or hypothetical 're-ba' and 'ta-ra' forms. In conditional, hypothetical, or counterfactual clauses, it is often possible to use both forms.

(3) However, the 'ta-ra' is used more frequently than 're-ba'. This is because the main sentence of 're-ba' is difficult to use unless the main sentence has a desirable meaning, as in (2), (3), and (5) [Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. (n.d.)].

(4) As in (1b''), "na-ra" may be used if the event is true or is meant to emphasize the event. In the opinion of the authors, who translated it into Japanese, the best option is (1b'').

(5) As for counterfactual sentences as (4) and (5), in Hindi, the imperfective participle is used alone in (4a), which in the past, was also used to express the present. It can still be used in narratives as in (6a).

(6) (6b'), and (6b'') require 'no-ni' at the end of every sentence, if (6a), analogous to (4a), has a counterfactual meaning, i.e., *hetuhetumad bhūtkāl* in traditional Hindi grammar. However, when expressing a general condition, 'no-ni' is not attached. If (6a) has habitual or generic meaning, (6b'') is the best choice for Japanese translation.

References

Comrie, Bernard. (1976). *Aspects*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Deo, Ashwini. (2007). Tense and Aspect in Indo-Aryan Languages: Variation and Diachrony. Stanford University. Accessed 20 July 2022, URL: https://ojs.ub.uni-konstanz.de/jsal/dissertations/deo-diss.pdf f [PhD. dissertation (unpublished)]

Masica, Colin P. (1991). *The Indo-Aryan Languages*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mikami, Akira. (2007 [1963). Nihongo no koubun. Tokyo: Kuroshio shuppan.

Schmidt, R. L. (2005 [1999 1st edition]). *Urdu: An Essential Grammar* (Kindle ed.). New York: Routledge.

Tokieda, Motoki. (2005 [1950]). Nihon bunpou kougo-hen. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.

Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. (n.d.). *Nihongo bunpou jouken:kaisetsu*. Retrieved September 5, 2022, from Language Module, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies:
http://www.coelang.tufs.ac.jp/mt/ja/gmod/contents/explanation/083.html

---

[3] Nowadays "na-**ra-ba**" and "ta-**ra-ba**" tend to be used only in archaic Japanese.

Illustrative examples:

(1) a. agar rām āe-gā   to   maĩ nahĩ̄ āū̃-gā.
       if   Ram come-FUT.M.SG then I   NEG come-FUT.M.SG
    b. ?(moshi) rāmu＝ga   ku-re-ba   boku＝wa ko-nai.
       (if)   Ram＝NOM come-IPFV-COND I＝TOP   come-NEG.NPST
    b'. (moshi) rāmu＝ga   ki-ta-ra   boku＝wa ko-nai.
       (if)   Ram＝NOM   come-PFV-COND I＝TOP   come-NEG.NPST
       'If Ram comes, then I will not come.'
    b". (moshi) rāmu＝ga   kuru-na-ra   boku＝wa ko-nai.
       (if)   Ram＝NOM come-AUX-COND I＝TOP   come-NEG.NPST
       'If Ram comes, then I will not come.'

(2) a. agar ram āe   to   maĩ nahĩ̄ āū̃-gā.
       if   Ram come-PTN.M.SG then I   NEG come-FUT.M.SG
    b. ?(moshi) rāmu＝ga   ku-re-ba   boku＝wa ko-nai.
       (if)   Ram＝NOM come-IPFV-COND I＝TOP   come-NEG.NPST
    b'. (moshi) rāmu＝ga   ki-ta-ra   boku＝wa ko-nai.
       (if)   Ram＝NOM   come-PFV-COND I＝TOP   come-NEG.NPST
       'If Ram comes, then I will not come.'

(3) a. agar rām āyā   to   maĩ nahĩ̄ āū̃-gā.
       if   Ram come-PFV(PST).M.SG then I   NEG   come-FUT.M.SG
    b. ?(moshi) rāmu＝ga   ku-re-ba   boku＝wa ko-nai.
       (if)   Ram＝NOM come-IPFV-COND I＝TOP   come-NEG.NPST
    b'. (moshi) rāmu＝ga   ki-ta-ra   boku＝wa ko-nai.
       (if)   Ram＝NOM   come-PFV-COND I＝TOP   come-NEG.NPST
       'If Ram comes, then I will not come.'

Counterfactuals

(4) a. agar rām ā-tā   to   acchā   ho-tā.
       if   Ram come-IPFV.M.SG then good.M.SG be-IPFV.M.SG
    b. rāmu＝ga   ku-re-ba   ii   no-ni⁴.
       Ram＝NOM come-IPFV-COND good-NPST though
    b'. rāmu＝ga   ki-ta-ra   ii   no-ni.
       Ram＝NOM   come-PFV-COND good-NPST though
       'If Ram came, it would be good.'

(5) a. agar bhārat bīc   mẽ na ā-yā   ho-tā   to
       if   India between LOC NEG come-PFV.M.SG be-IPFV.M.SG then
       yūkren kā   kyā ho-tā?
       Ukrine GEN what be-IPFV
    b. (moshi) indo＝ga   aida＝ni   haira-nakere-ba
       (if)   India＝NOM between＝LOC enter-NEG.IPFV-COND

---

⁴ The part is considered to consist of the nominalizer (NMLZ) 'no' + particle 'ni' and functions as contradictory conjunction (but, however, though, etc.)

ukuraina=wa dou natta /na-tte ita ka?
Ukrine=TOP how become.PST/become-CONJ be.PST Q

b'. (moshi) indo=ga aida=ni haira-nakatta-ra
(if) India=NOM between=LOC enter-NEG.PFV-COND
ukuraina=wa dou na-tta /na-tte ita ka?
Ukrine=TOP how become-PST/become-CONJ be.PST Q
'What would have happened to Ukraine if India had not come in the middle?'

Counterfactual or narrative
(6) a. bāriś ho-tī to mausam badal jā-tī.
     rain.F be-IPFV.F then weather.M change GO-IPFV.F
     b. ame=ga fu-re-ba tenki=ga kawaru (no-ni).
     rain=NOM fall-IPFV-COND wheather=NOM change.NPST though
     b'. ame=ga fu-tta-ra tenki=ga kawaru (no-ni).
     rain=NOM fall-PFV-COND wheather=NOM change.NPST though
     'If it rained, the weather would change.' 'The weather changes when it rains.'
     b". ame=ga fu-ru-to tenki=ga kawaru (no-ni).
     rain=NOM fall-PFV-COND wheather=NOM change.NPST though
     'If/When it rains, the weather changes.'

❖

24. **Patrizia Noel**, Professor, Germanistische Sprachwissenschaft, Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, 96047 Bamberg, Germany
     German(ic) V1 conditionals from syntax to morphology

The V1 conditional is one of the oldest syntactic patterns of Germanic. Gothic had a particle-introduced conditional construction (1); when it was lost, V1 grammaticalised as an ambiguous indicator of the conditional in all Germanic languages (2, 3). In today's modern Germanic languages, the productivity of the general V1 conditional construction seems to be on the decline (3).

(1) Gothic:
     þanuh qaþ Marþa du Iesua: frauja, iþ weseis her, ni þau gadauþnodedi broþar meins.
     'Then said Martha unto Jesus, Lord, if thou hadst been here, my brother had not died.'
     (John 11: 21)
(2) Swedish:
     Ligger *boken på golvet, (då) ska du lyfta upp den.*
     'If the book is lying on the floor, then you'll have to pick it up.'
     (Lindström/Karlsson 2005 : 101)
(3) English:
     *Need *you any help, please let us know.*

In this talk, the German pattern is claimed to be undergoing a change: the rise of the *sollen*- V1 conditional (cf. Auer/Lindström 2011, Van den Nest 2010). The lexical selection of the modal verb *sollen* 'shall' goes hand in hand with a non-optional selection of its tense and mood (4, 5), i.e. the preterite subjunctive "fake tense" *soll-t-*. A similar change has already taken place in English, in which the only non-auxiliary left in this pattern is *should* (Iatridou/ Embick 1994: 191).

(4)   Standard German
       Sollten Sie 98 kg wiegen, so sollten Sie … (http://www.linguee.de)
       'Should you weigh 98 kg, you should …'
(5)   Dialect of Hohenlohe (Baden-Württemberg/Germany)
       Souldschd frier dro sei, nimmschd eifach dn Bus.
       'Should you be early, just take the bus.'

A precondition for the current change of the German V1 conditional pattern has been proposed to lie in the ambiguity of V1 patterns (Auer/Lindström 2011: 254), while the motivation for the lexical selection of the English pattern has been suggested to be the unambiguity of conditionals introduced by *sollte/should* (Dancygier 1998: 192). In this talk, the development of German(ic) V1 conditionals is traced from their earliest attestation in Gothic particle-introduced V1 via Germanic particleless V1 to the German *sollen*-V1 conditional. I aim at pin-pointing the motivation of the early Germanic syntactic ambiguity and then to follow the path from ambiguous syntax to morphological marking. A motivation for the selection of the modal verb and its tense is proposed in the vein of Klein (1999).

References

Auer, Peter and Jan Lindström (2011), Verb-first conditionals in German and Swedish. In: Peter Auer and Stefan Pfänder (eds.), *Constructions: Emerging and Emergent*, 218–262. Berlin. Dancygier, Barbara (1998), *Conditionals and Prediction*. Cambridge.

Iatridou, Sabine and David Embick (1994), Conditional Inversion. *Proceedings of the North Eastern Linguistic Society* 24, 133-147. Cambridge, MA.

Klein, Wolfgang (1999). Wie sich das deutche Perfekt zusammensetzt. *Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik* 113, 52- 85.

Van den Nest, Daan (2010), "Should conditionals be emergent …" Asyndetic conditionals in English and German as a Challenge to Grammaticalization Research. In: An van linden, Jean-Christophe Verstraete and Kristin Davidse (eds.), *Formal evidence in grammaticalization research*, 93-136. Amsterdam.

❖

25. Lorenzo Rossi & Caterina Sisti, University of Turin, Italy
Variable-hypotheticals conditionals

Consider the following conditional: 'if Tweetie is a bird, then Tweetie flies':

$$B(t) \rightarrow F(t).$$

This seems like an acceptable conditional. Let's model acceptability via degrees of probability, and suppose that this conditional has probability k:

$$Pr(B(t) \rightarrow F(t)) = k,$$

for $k \in [0,1]$ and $k \geq 1/2$. Of course, accepting this conditional presupposes several background assumptions – that Tweetie is not a penguin, and not a chick, and so on. Abbreviate the conjunction of these sentences as $\phi(t)$. The full form of the conditional, therefore, is the following:

$$B(t) \wedge \phi(t) \rightarrow F(t).$$

We call the latter an extended conditional, and we also assume that the acceptability of a conditional is identical to that of its extension, i.e.

$$Pr(B(t) \wedge \phi(t) \rightarrow F(t)) = k.$$

What we just sketched is the beginning of the variable hypothetical account of conditionals (inspired by Ramsey 1931, 1991). According to this account, $B(t) \wedge \phi(t) \rightarrow F(t)$ is acceptable because it is an instance of a generalisation, called 'variable hypothetical', of the type 'Everything that is B and ϕ is also F':

$$\forall x(B(x) \wedge \phi(x) \rightarrow F(x)).$$

In this account, variable hypotheticals do the heavy lifting: they determine the probability assignment of the corresponding conditionals. We suppose that we have a primitive probability assignment to variable hypotheticals and that all their instances inherit that assignment, namely:

$$Pr(\forall x(B(x) \wedge \phi(x) \rightarrow F(x))) = k.$$

This is why a speaker assigns probability k to $B(t) \rightarrow F(t)$: the probability of the latter is identical to the probability of its extension which, in turn, is identical to the probability of the associated variable hypothetical.

In this paper, we make this picture fully precise. We develop a contextualist semantics for probability assignments to simple conditionals. Contexts, in our picture, play two distinct but related roles. First, they assign, with each speaker, the ϕ that determines the extended conditional. For example, in a context c1 where the speaker is s1, $B(t) \rightarrow F(t)$ is extended with a $\phi1$ that states that Tweetie is not a chick and not a penguin, while in another context c2, where

the speaker is s2, the same conditional might be extended with a φ2 that only states that Tweetie is not a chick. In addition, contexts determine the probability of variable hypotheticals. So, we might have that in c1, $Pr(\forall x(B(x) \wedge \phi1(x) \rightarrow F(x))) = j$ and $Pr(\forall x(B(x) \wedge \phi2(x) \rightarrow F(x))) = k$, while in c2, $Pr(\forall x(B(x) \wedge \phi1(x) \rightarrow F(x))) = m$ and $Pr(\forall x(B(x) \wedge \phi2(x) \rightarrow F(x))) = n$. This allows us to explain speakers' disagreement along two dimensions: first, two speakers s1 and s2 might disagree on the probability of $B(t) \rightarrow F(t)$ because they associate it with two distinct variable hypotheticals; second, s1 and s2 might disagree on the probability of $B(t) \rightarrow F(t)$ because, even though they select the same φ and therefore associate $B(t) \rightarrow F(t)$ with the same variable hypothetical, they assign different degrees of probability to the latter (based on their different available evidence, their different beliefs, and so on).

Finally, we work out a conditional logic (based on probability preservation and relations between the extra information φ) which provides an attractive picture of hypothetical reasoning, avoids the paradoxes of material implication, and can be used to differentiate between indicatives and subjunctives.

References

Ramsey, F. P., 1931, 'General Propositions and Causality', in Braithwaite, R. (ed.), Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Ramsey, F. P., 1991, 'The Meaning of Hypothetical propositions', in Galavotti, M. C. (ed.), Notes on Philosophy, Probability, and Mathematics, Napoli: Bibliopolis.

❖

26. Haruka Shimura, Graduate Student, Linguistics, University of Tsukuba, Japan
On the future perfect in English open conditionals and their Japanese correspondents

There have been many studies on tense and aspect in English and Japanese conditionals, but to my knowledge, no study offers a systematic analysis of the relationship between the English future perfect (*will* + *have* + past participle) in the apodosis of open conditionals, as in (1a), and its Japanese correspondents. Generally, the Japanese past form *-ta* corresponds not only to the English past tense, but also to the perfect *have* + past participle (e.g. *Moo tabe-ta* '(I) have already eaten'). This might lead us to expect that the *-ta* form can be used as correspondent of the future perfect in (1a), but this is not the case, as shown in (1b). In this case, the *-ta* form followed by *koto-ni-naru* should be used in the apodosis (in English education in Japan, we are taught that way).

(1) a. If you have finished the job by tomorrow, you will have exceeded our expectations.
         (Fenn 1987:225; cf. Declerck and Reed 2001:289)

     b. (*Mosi*) *anata-ga asu-madeni sigoto-o oe-tara, watasitati-no*
         if you-Nom tomorrow-by job-Acc finish-Past-Cond, our-Gen
         yosoo-o koe {??-ta-/?-te-i-ru-/-ta-koto-ni-na-ru-} (*daroo*).
         expectation-Acc exceed{-Past-/-Perf-be-Pres-/-Past-Comp-Prt-become-Pres-} I think

Why, then, the apodosis cannot utilize *-ta* as correspondent of the future perfect? To systematically explain this, this study adopts the temporal structure analysis in Wada (2019, 2021), which has analyzed many phenomena concerning tense, aspect and modality in English and Japanese.

Wada's analysis is based on protype theory to assume that any type of verb describes a situation, specific or schematic, expressing an event time. In the temporal structure of the future perfect, *will* expresses a prediction at speech time and its event time (E_1); the perfect tense consists of a situation described by perfect *have*, and one described by the past participle, which respectively represent E_2 and E_3. E_1 is located at speech time because of the nature of modal elements (prediction is assumed as a modality); E_2 is situated at a future time, to which E_3 is prior. Perfect *have* denotes a resultant state holding at the future reference time.

The *-ta* form has the temporal structure consisting only of one event time (E), its situation occurring prior to a reference time. Since this form only represents a prior situation, it needs an element denoting a resultant state corresponding to that described by perfect *have* when intended to express the sense of the future perfect. In this connection, Suzuki (2017) states that the relevant "X *koto-ni-naru*" form implies, 'we predict at speech time that given a certain perspective/viewpoint, the situation of X will be actualized as a natural consequence' and the change of state implied here is attributed to the lexical meaning of *naru* 'become'. So a resultant state is created in the future. Hence *-koto-ni-naru* is attached to the *-ta* form. Our analysis can explain, as a consequence, why the *tei-ru* form, another correspondent of the English perfect, cannot appear in the linguistic environment at issue, as in (1b). It is said that *iru* 'be' in this form is a stative verb in the non-past form and so the situation involved obtains in the present. Thus the resultant state does not hold at the future reference time.

References

Declerck, R. and S. Reed (2001) *Conditionals*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Fenn, P. (1987) *A Semantic and Pragmatic Examination of the English Perfect*, Narr.
Suzuki, Y. (2017) "'P-kotoninaru' gata no bun ni tuite (On "P-kotoninaru" sentences)," *Kokubunronsoo* 52.
Wada, N. (2019) *The Grammar of Future Expressions in English*, Kaitakusha.
Wada, N. (2021) "Tense Choice and Interpretation in First-Person Stories; A Contrastive Study of English and Japanese," in *Aspect of Tenses, Modality, and Evidentiality*, Brill.

❖

27. **Daria Sidorkina**, Intern researcher, Laboratory of Formal Models in Linguistics, HSE University, Moscow, Russia
    Hunting for Khanty X-marking

There are numerous accounts of past tense as a component of counterfactual marking in conditionals, but close to no languages have been discussed in the literature on this topic where past tense itself is enough to signal counterfactuality without any additional aspectual or modal marking [Lazard 1998]. The aim of this talk is to describe counterfactual marking in Kazym Khanty (Uralic > Khantic) using the notion of X-marking proposed by [Fintel von, Iatridou 2020]. I will argue that in Kazym Khanty the past tense morpheme can X-mark independently.

The data was gathered during fieldwork trips of HSE University to the Kazym village in 2021-2022 via elicitation using both Russian and Khanty stimuli and contexts with occasional implementation of narrative elicitation as proposed in [Louie 2015].

Khanty conditionals are X-marked with the past tense morpheme (PST) in the protasis, and PST with an optional irrealis particle *λɵλən* in the apodosis:

(1) {Dad usually comes home at the weekends, but this time he is too busy at work}
aśe-w χăλewət juχət-əs ki mʉŋ (λɵλən) χʉλ ńań wɛr-s-əw
father-POSS.1PL tomorrow come-PST[3SG] if we (IRR) fish bread make-PST-1PL
'If father came tomorrow, we would make fish pie'

Since the particle is optional, PST can X-mark on its own. Similarly, PST X-marks in contexts of weak necessity and unattainable desire with want-predicates in accordance with the generalizations of von Fintel and Iatridou, and also in optatives.

Van linden, Verstraete (2008) highlight a similar case of Georgian, where the pluperfect can X-mark the apodosis of a conditional, but in a simple clause an additional modal component is required. They propose that the modal component is not needed in conditionals because the protasis has a modal meaning.

Notably, the irrealis particle *λɵλən* itself does not X-mark. It can be used in the non-past domains to convey the desirability of the apodosis. However, it does not occur anywhere besides the contexts where X-marking is possible.

(2) χăλəwet mojən_χujat ki juχət-λ-ət aśe-n λɵλən pewəλtχot ăλ-əλ-λe
tomorrow guests if come-NPST-3PL father-POSS.2SG IRR bathhouse heat-NPST-SG > SG
'If guests come tomorrow, father will (finally) heat up the bath'
{Consultant: it feels like we want father to do it}

I argue that the reason the irrealis particle *λɵλən* appears solely in X-marking contexts is that it is only capable of shifting the modal flavour of an existing modal operator but lacks a quantifier and cannot express desirability as a standalone modal.

Given that PST can formally function as an X-marker, I nonetheless do not claim that it carries the meaning associated with X-marking on its own — in that case the role of *λɵλən* in X-marking would remain unclear. My proposal is that the X-marking in apodosis is not carried out by PST alone, but derived compositionally from the combination of PST and a null epistemic modal operator of the apodosis [Kratzer 1986]. *λɵλən* can optionally add the deontic modal flavour to the epistemic modality, but the derived meaning remains the same.

Glosses: 1 – first person, 2 – second person, 3 – third person, IRR – irrealis particle, NPST – non-past tense, PL – plural, POSS – possessive, PST – past tense, SG – singular, > - object agreement.

References
von Fintel, K. & S. Iatridou (2020) Prolegomena to a theory of X-marking. Ms. under review for *Linguistics and Philosophy*.

Hewitt, B. G. (1995). *Georgian: A structural reference grammar*. Vol. 2. John Benjamins Publishing.

Kratzer, A. (1986). Conditionals. *Chicago Linguistics Society*. Vol. 22. № 2. P. 1–15.

Lazard, L. (1998). L'expression de l'irréel: essai de typologie. Typology of Verbal Categories (eds.) L. Kulikov & H. Vater. Berlin: De Gruyter, 237–248.

Louie, M. (2015). The problem with no-nonsense elicitation plans (for semantic fieldwork). *Methodologies in semantic fieldwork*, 47–71.

Iatridou, S. (2000) The Grammatical Ingredients of Counterfactuality. *Linguistic Inquiry*. 2000. Vol. 31. № 2. P. 231–270.

A. Van linden, J.-C. (2008). Verstraete. The nature and origins of counterfactuality in simple clauses. *Journal of Pragmatics*. Vol. 40. № 11. P. 1865–1895.

❖

28. Vesela Simeonova, Professor, Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Institut für Germanistik, Mozartgasse 8, 3.3 OG, A-8010 Graz, Austria
Evidentials in counterfactuals: real or fake?

Background. This talk explores evidential marking in conditional environments. Conditionals have been routinely used since Faller (2002) to establish the level of interpretation at which evidentials operate in a given language (Matthewson et al. 2007; McCready & Ogata 2007); however, whether evidentials and conditionals semantically interact has not been addressed to date.

Empirical findings. The empirical focus is on Bulgarian, a Balkan language with a well-studied reportative ("REP"; Izvorski, 1997; Smirnova, 2013, 2021; Koev, 2017) and a less formally explored direct evidential mood ("DIR"; 'confirmative' in Friedman, 1988). The central novel observation is that <u>in conditionals, DIR gives rise to unambiguously counterfactual ("CF") meanings</u>, while – temporal and aspectual anchoring being the same – this REP does not:

(1) Ako znae-she/znae-la, shte-she/shtja-la   da   ti   kazhe.
     if   knew-DIR/REP   FUT.DIR/REP   SUBJ you.ACC tell.3SG
     i = 'If she knew, she would tell you.'
     DIR: counterfactual only
     REP: it is reported that *i* – both epistemically open and CF interpretations

This observation raises a number of questions, e.g. why does evidentiality affect the conditional's interpretation? How does the meaning arise compositionally, given that none of the components of (1) expresses counterfactuality in itself?

Proposal. The example informs two properties: the scope of evidentials wrt conditionals and the interpretation – of the conditional and of the evidential. I argue that there is a deterministic relationship between these properties: REP has no effect on conditional type *because* it scopes above conditionals, and DIR interacts *because* it scopes under. Furthermore, while REP retains its surface meaning (the whole conditional is reported), DIR "loses" its literal evidential contribution: the DIR-marked CF does not literally mean "I have direct evidence that *i*…".

I explore the idea that this happens by virtue of DIR interacting with the conditional and giving rise to the evidential counterpart of the "fake" tense puzzle in CFs (Iatridou, 2000). The question, then, is whether DIR is real or fake in CFs, casting a third dimension to that puzzle in addition to tense and aspect (Arregui, 2007; Ippolito, 2006; Karawani, 2014; von Fintel & Iatridou, 2022).

I pursue a CF DIR as real DIR approach, exploring how it contributes CF meaning via two components. First, a relationship between DIR and factivity: by expressing what is directly perceived, DIR is epistemically extended to what is known; this rules it out from epistemically open conditionals, explaining why it is restricted to CFs. To capture why DIR is ok in CFs that are not about directly observed events, I propose that DIR in simple sentences quantifies over events, and in CFs, over worlds, in analogy with Iatridou's 2000 proposal on tense. This allows a unified view of CF, regardless whether the locus of CF is tense or mood in a given language.

In sum, this talk demonstrates the importance of evidential values – in addition to tense and aspect – for the interpretation of conditionals, and opens intriguing new avenues for crosslinguistic research.

References

Arregui, A. C. (2005). *On the Accessiblity of Possible Worlds: The Role of Tense and Aspect*. UMass Amherst dissertation.

Faller, M. T. (2002). *Semantics and pragmatics of evidentials in Cuzco Quechua*. Stanford university dissertation.

Von Fintel, K. & S. Iatridou (2022). Prolegomena to a theory of X-marking. Manuscript available on https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005290.

Friedman, V. A. (1986). Evidentiality in the Balkans: Macedonian, Bulgarian, and Albanian. In Chafe, W. and N. Nickols (Eds) *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology*, 168-187.

Iatridou, S. (2000). The grammatical ingredients of counterfactuality. *Linguistic inquiry*, *31*(2), 231-270.

Ippolito, M. (2006). Semantic composition and presupposition projection in subjunctive conditionals. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, *29*(6), 631-672.

Izvorski, R. (1997, November). The present perfect as an epistemic modal. In *Semantics and Linguistic Theory, 7*, 222-239.

Karawani, H. (2014). *The real, the fake, and the fake fake: In counterfactual conditionals, crosslinguistically*. Netherlands Graduate School of Linguistics.

Koev, T. (2017). Evidentiality, learning events and spatiotemporal distance: The view from Bulgarian. *Journal of semantics, 34*(1), 1-41.

Matthewson, L., Davis, H., & Rullmann, H. (2007). Evidentials as epistemic modals: Evidence from St'át'imcets. *Linguistic variation yearbook, 7*(1), 201-254.

McCready, E., & Ogata, N. (2007). Evidentiality, modality and probability. *Linguistics and philosophy, 30*(2), 147-206.

Smirnova, A. (2013). Evidentiality in Bulgarian: Temporality, epistemic modality, and information source. *Journal of semantics, 30*(4), 479-532.

Smirnova, A. (2021). Evidentiality in Abductive Reasoning: Experimental Support for a Modal Analysis of Evidentials. *Journal of semantics, 38*(4), 531-570.

❖

29. **Frank Sode**, Department of Linguistics, University of Göttingen, Germany
The argument-status of non-logical 'if'-clauses: Evidence from German embedded V2

Williams (1974) points out that in a construction with certain evaluative predicates (*glad, like, prefer*, etc.) an *if*-clause can be complement fulfilling, i.e., it can satisfy the argument requirement of the predicate. 'If'-clauses that fulfill this requirement are known as "non-logical 'if'-clauses" (= NLIs); Pesetsky (1991). In German, NLIs can under certain conditions be substituted by V2-clauses; for example, when the construction shows the X-marking pattern of a counterfactual (= matrix and embedded predicate in past subjunctive mood), (3) vs. (2), or when the predicate is used in its comparative or superlative form, (4) vs. (2).

(1)   Ich finde   es gut,   wenn du   mir hilfst.
      I   find.Ind it good if   you me help.Ind
      'I like it if you help me.'
(2)   *Ich finde   es gut,   du   hilfst   mir.
      I   find.Ind it good you help.Ind me
      intended: 'I like it if you help me.'
(3)   Ich fände   es gut,   du   würdest   mir helfen.
      I   find.PstSubj it good you will.PstSubj me help
      'I would like (it) if you helped me.'
(4)   Ich finde   es besser, du   hilfst   mir.
      I   find.Ind it besser you help.Ind me
      'I prefer (it) if you help me.'

I want to focus on the X-marked case in (3). I show that the construction with a V2-clause is more restricted in interpretation than the corresponding constructions with a *wenn* ('if')-clause. In the terminology of von Fintel & Iatridou (2020): While the X-marking on the embedding predicate in a construction with a *wenn* ('if')-clause can be both, exo-X (= evaluation under actual circumstances) and endo-X marking (= evaluation under counterfactual circumstances), in a construction with a V2-clause it can only be endo-X marking. That is, if I utter (3), I can only report an "unattainable wish" (von Fintel & Iatridou 2020); I cannot express what I would like *if* the circumstances were different. I provide several grammatical test environments and contexts that are exclusively compatible with either exo-X or endo-X marking. The embedded modal *sollte* ('should') in   (5), for example, is compatible only with an exo-X marking on the embedding predicate and, therefore, leads to ungrammaticality with a V2-clause, (5-b).

(5)   a. Ich fände   es gut,   wenn du   mir helfen solltest.
         I   find.PstSubj it good if   you me help   should
         'I would like it if you should help me.'

      b. *Ich fände   es gut,   du   solltest mir helfen.
         I   find.PstSubj it good you should   me help

44

I take the data from German to provide more direct evidence for a true argument interpretation of NLIs than the data presented in previous work (Grosz 2012; Kaufmann 2017; Longenbaugh 2019; Sode 2021).

References.
von Fintel, K. & Sabine I. 2020. Prolegomena to a theory of X-marking. Ms.
Grosz, P. G. 2012. *On the grammar of optative constructions*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Kaufmann, M. 2017. Japanese modals and other evaluations. MIT Seminar.
Longenbaugh, N. 2019. On expletives and the agreement-movement correlation. MIT diss.
Pesetsky, D. 1991. Zero syntax. Vol. 2. Ms.
Sode, F. 2021. A semantics for complement fulfilling conditionals with glad. SuB 25, 769–786.
Williams, E. S. 1974. Rule ordering in syntax. MIT diss.

❖

30. **Bergül Soykan**, Department of Linguistics, MIT, USA
Past in Turkish Conditionals

BACKGROUND: The past morpheme in Turkish conditionals can either precede the indicative conditional marker or follow the subjunctive one as shown by (1) and (2), respectively. While (1) can be uttered in a context where the speaker is oblivious about whether Esra went home or not, (2) is most likely to be uttered when the speaker knows that she did not go home, i.e., in counterfactual scenarios.

(1) Esra ev-e   git-ti-*yse*,   anne-si   sevin-ir.
     Esra home-Dat go-PAST-*IND.COND*   mother-3SgPoss be.happy-AOR
     'If Esra went home, her mother will be happy.'
(2) Esra ev-e   git-*se*-ydi,   anne-si   sevin-ir-di.
     Esra home-Dat go-*SUBJ.COND*-PAST   mother-3SgPoss be.happy-AOR-PAST
     'If Esra had gone/went home, her mother would have been/would be happy.'

There are also the non-past subjunctive conditional constructions in Turkish as in (3), which can be licensed in cases where the speaker believes the antecedent event to be unlikely to occur.

(3) Esra ev-e   git-*se*   anne-si   sevin-ir.
     Esra home-Dat go-*SUBJ.COND* mother-3SgPoss   be.happy-AOR
     'If Esra went home, her mother would be happy.'

PROBLEM: The differences between these constructions can be handled from two perspectives.
PAST [INDICATIVE VS SUBJUNCTIVE]: The antecedent past marker in (1) does not affect the time of its consequent whereas the one in (2) requires the use of past in the consequent clause. Interestingly though, it is not necessary to have the past morpheme in the antecedent to have a past subjunctive conditional; having it in the consequent would suffice without any significant meaning difference. Moreover, while the past indicative conditional only licenses past time

adverbials in its antecedent, the subjunctive one can be used with both past and non-past adverbials.

[NON-PAST VS PAST] SUBJUNCTIVE: Although both (2) and (3) are accessible in counterfactual contexts where Esra is not going home at the utterance time, they differ in their presuppositions. For instance, the existence presupposition must hold for the non-past subjunctive but not for the past version; namely, (2) is still available in a context time where Esra is not alive while (3) is not.

PROPOSAL: Considering all these aspects, I claim that the past in subjunctive conditionals is interpreted outside the modal operator (Ippolito, 2002), setting the modal time ("reference time" in her proposal) to the past while the one in indicatives is interpreted inside its own proposition. I suggest that this shift in the modal time of the conditional clause lets us make claims about the future possibilities from a past perspective and hence makes it possible to use non-past time adverbials along with the past ones. However, contrary to Ippolito's (2002) claim, I argue that past subjunctives hold no presuppositions with respect to the utterance time (Leahy, 2011), to explain the difference between past and non-past subjunctives. In my account, non-past subjunctives have a special speaker-oriented likelihood presupposition, where the speaker considers the antecedent to be more likely to be false than true, in addition to other presuppositions. Nevertheless, the past subjunctive holds no presuppositions and generates the counterfactuality implicature by competing with its past indicative counterpart (Leahy, 2017).

References

Ippolito, M. (2002). *The time of possibilities: Truth and felicity of subjunctive conditionals* (PhD thesis). Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Leahy, B. (2011). Presuppositions and antipresuppositions in conditionals. In N. Ashton, A. Chereches, and D. Lutz (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 21st Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference* (pp. 257-274). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University.

Leahy, B. (2017). Counterfactual antecedent falsity and the epistemic sensitivity of counterfactuals. *Philosophical Studies, 175*(1), 45-69. doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0855-z

❖

31. **Rania Talbi-Boulhais**, Université de Poitiers, Laboratoires CRLA et FORELLIS.
Les prépositions A et DE dans l'expression de l'hypothèse en espagnol

Outre le mode subjonctif et le conjonctif conditionnel « si » qui permettent de poser ou de déclarer un événement comme hypothétique ou possible, l'espagnol, comme le français d'ailleurs, dispose d'autres outils linguistiques pour exprimer l'inactualité d'un événement dans le discours, comme les futurs thétique et hypothétique *(estará/estaría durmiendo)*, les adverbes *(duerme tal vez, quizá duerma)*, les périphrases verbales *(debe/debe de dormir)* et les prépositions *(de/a no estar durmiendo, lo llamaría -s'il ne dormait pas , je l'appellerais-)*.

Parmi les différentes modalités existantes pour exprimer la non-réalisation d'un événement en espagnol, on retiendra pour ce travail les prépositions *a* et *de et ponctuellement l'expression modale « debe de estar enfermo/debe estar enfermo »* -il doit être malade-.

En effet, les infinitifs présent ou passé marqués préalablement et prépositionnellement par les relateurs *a* et *de* peuvent jouer le rôle d'une proposition conditionnelle en espagnol. Ces deux prépositions espagnoles ont donc comme point commun discursif de pouvoir hypothétiser un procès déclaré à l'infinitif : « *De haber podido venir, me hubiera divertido mucho -Si j'avais pu venir, je me serais beaucoup amusé-.* »/« *A no decirlo todo, más vale que calles -Si tu ne dis pas tout, il vaut mieux que tu te taises-*». « *De haber podido venir … *» indique une action antécédente envisagée dans sa possible réalisation, une action potentielle, l'infinitif passé rejette cette possibilité dans le passé où l'action potentielle n'a pas eu lieu (irréel du passé), condition difficilement réalisable, il s'agit d'un irréel du présent, le locuteur ne s'est pas amusé au moment où il prononce ces paroles, par conséquent l'événement de la principale ne peut se réaliser. Les constructions hypothétiques signalées et impliquées par ces deux prépositions permettent au locuteur de ne pas avoir recours au fait de langage que constitue la subordination et la conjonction de subordination par là-même.

La modalité conditionnelle ou l'aspect hypothétique d'un événement peut donc être marqué par les prépositions *a* et *de* que les grammaires espagnoles prescriptives, opérant par équivalence ou par traduction, rapprochent de la modalité exprimée par la conjonction « si ». Ces deux relateurs associés dans le discours à un infinitif, forme quasi-nominale porteuse d'une charge d'hypothèse intrinsèque, seraient, grammaticalement parlant, l'équivalent de l'expression conditionnelle « si ». Or, si la valeur puissancielle de l'infinitif peut se rapprocher effectivement des constructions conditionnelles par ce même refus de rendre actuel ou effectif un événement, les signifiants *a* et *de* ne peuvent en aucun cas spécifier une valeur inhérente de condition, contrairement à ce qu'affirment les grammaires normatives. C'est ce que nous essaierons de démontrer avec l'analyse linguistique de plusieurs énoncés où les prépositions espagnoles *a* et *de* tout en gardant leur valeur, comme on le verra, participent différemment, excluant ainsi toute synonymie, de l'expression de la condition, tout comme la syntaxe et le discours.

Exemple : → *Debe de estar enfermo/Debe ∅ estar enfermo (il doit être malade)*

Dans ces deux exemples, la distinction grammaticale obligation « deber » / hypothèse « deber de » est exprimée "normalement" par deux réalisations du verbe puissanciel "deber" -devoir-, une première réalisation que l'on peut qualifier d'immédiate ["deber ∅] et une seconde que l'on peut qualifier de "médiate" ["deber de"]. Cette "norme" n'est cependant pas systématiquement (pour ne pas dire "plus") respectée, car l'hypothèse [marquée de] prend la marque de l'obligation [∅] *debe estar enfermo*. L'annulation discursive du signe distinctif entre l'obligation et l'hypothèse montre que le discours ou le locuteur tend, ponctuellement ou pas, à ne plus différencier l'action obligatoire de l'action conjecturale comme en anglais (« must » ou en français « devoir ») : l'exemple *"debe ∅ estar enfermo"* n'actualise aucun signal hypothétique même s'il indique une possible inactualité ou une possible ineffectivité de l'événement envisagé *« être malade/estar enfermo »*. Ce signal n'est cependant pas nécessaire, *"estar enfermo"* ne déclarant pas une véritable action mais plutôt une situation, "debe" modalise l'état énoncé et l'inscrit dans une "zone puissancielle" -hypothèse- ; l'idée d'obligation, incompatible avec la visée résultative (estar/être), n'est donc pas convoquée ici malgré l'absence du relateur *de*. ∅ permet d'appréhender une situation plus effective et moins hypothétique qu'avec *de* (par sa perspective efférente, la préposition *de* reléguerais cet état ou cette situation -toujours plus effectif(ve) qu'une action- dans une antériorité par rapport à ∅ et dans le domaine de l'improbabilité).

❖

32. Naoaki Wada, Professor, University of Tsukuba, Japan
Tense and Aspect in Conditionals: A Contrastive Study of English and Japanese

Among studies comparing English with Japanese conditionals, Arita (2009) offers an intriguing analysis of their tense/aspect/modality phenomena based on the notion "settledness". A clause is settled when its proposition's truth value is determined at speech time (S), so a protasis denoting a past or present situation (and a scheduled/determined future situation) is settled, while one describing a future situation is unsettled. On this basis, she distinguishes "predictive conditionals"—their protasis is unsettled—from "epistemic conditionals"—their protasis is settled but its truth value is unknown to the speaker. In Japanese, the two conditionals are distinguished morpho-syntactically. In predictive conditionals, the (unsettled) protasis includes non-tensed forms followed by the conditional marker *-(r)eba/-tara* or *-ta* forms as relative past followed by the conditional marker *-nara* (1); in epistemic conditionals, the (settled) protasis contains present forms or non-tensed forms with the stative marker *-tei-* followed by *-(no)-nara* (2).

(1) *Mosi kaiketusaku-ga* {*mitukar-eba/mitukat-tara/mitukat-ta-nara*} *uresi-i.*
     if   solution-Nom {be.found-Cond/ -Cond/ -Rel.Past-Cond} be.happy-Pres
     'I will be happy if a solution is found.'
(2) *Mosi kaiketusaku-ga* {*mitukar-u-(no)-nara/mitukat-tei{-reba/-tara}*} *uresi-i.*
     if   solution-Nom {be.found-Pres-(no)-Cond/ -tei{-Cond/-Cond}} be.happy-Pres
     'I will be happy if it is certain that a solution will be found.'

However, Arita's analysis does not explain systematically why Japanese has such a tense (predicate)-form-choice pattern, which differs from the English one. I explain it in a unified model of tense/aspect/modality/mental attitudes by Wada (2019, 2021), which has analyzed the temporal/modal phenomena of the two conditionals in English. It assumes that a sentential utterance consists of the domains of propositional content (P) and speaker's mental attitudes (SA), i.e., modality. It also assumes Hirose's (1995) generalization that English is oriented to the public self (the subject of communication) and Japanese to the private self (the subject of thinking/consciousness). Therefore, English finite forms are absolute tenses and chosen based on S—on which the public self is always fixed—while Japanese predicates—including tensed and non-tensed forms in Arita's sense—are all relative tenses and their choice depends on the characteristics of the linguistic environment involved. In predictive conditionals, the protasis, consisting only of the P domain, is incorporated into the P domain of the apodosis because of the "direct" causal relationship between the two clauses, so Japanese predicates are chosen and interpreted based on the time of the apodosis in the P domain (we need not assume exceptionally that *-ta* forms in *-nara* clauses are relative past). In epistemic conditionals, the protasis consists of the SA and P domains and involves its own modality. Thus, a modal like *will*, expressing predictive modality holding at S, can appear in the protasis. Like Arita, I assume that *n(o)* and *-tei-* in this context indicate newly-learnedness and perfectivity respectively, both evoking the notion "certainty"—assertive modality conveyed by non-modalized forms in our model. However, the protasis in (2) can refer to certainty holding in the future because it can be modified by a future-time adverb like *asita* 'tomorrow', which is unsettled—a problem for Arita. In our analysis,

due to the private-self orientation of Japanese, the tense/predicate-form choice here is based on a future time to which the private self is shifted, so the future situation can be asserted.

References

Arita, S. (2009) Tense and Settledness in Japanese Conditionals. In B. Pizziconi and M. Kizu (eds.) *Japanese Modality*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hirose, Y. (1995) Direct and Indirect Speech as Quotations of Public and Private Self. *Lingua* 95.

Wada, N. (2019) *The Grammar of Future Expressions in English*. Kaitakusha.

Wada, N. (2021) "Tense Choice and Interpretation in First-Person Stories," In L. Baranzini and L. Saussure (eds.), *Aspects of Tenses, Modality, and Evidentiality*. Brill.

❖

33. Lin Xiao, Post-doctoral Researcher, École normale supérieur de Paris.
Typological markers associated with the Protasis-apodosis systems, including the hypothetical conditional constructions, from a cross-linguistic perspective

In this paper, we investigate the protasis/apodosis (conditional clause/main clause) system in typologically different languages such as Mandarin, French, Latin, Ancient Greek, Palau, and Turkish. In these languages, various markers with a hypothetical (and/or temporal) value are used. There are case markers (as in ex. 1), markers related to substantivation (ex. 3), i.e. what Lyons (1977) calls construction of entities marking nominalizations, markers related to enunciation (ex. 4, 6, 7, 9). In several cases, it could be necessary to add anaphoric/cataphoric markers (ex. 4, 5, 6, 7) referring from apodosis to protasis or from protasis to apodosis.

Turkish:
(1)   gel   -diğ   -iniz   -de
      come   action noun   Poss2pl   Locative
      "when you came" (lit. 'in your coming')
(2)   gel   -se   -niz
      come   gerund   Poss2pl
      "if you come"

Palau:
(3)   a   k-   u- súub , ế ak   mo páss ər   a   tést
      Article(=if) HF.1sg HF study, et Subjet.1sg Fut. pass Prep Article exam
         "If I study, I'll pass the test."   [HF = Hypothetical form]   (Josephs 1975)

French:
(4)   Si Paul réussissait son concours, alors tout le monde serait content.
      "If Paul was successful in his competition, then everyone would be happy."
(5)   Une erreur, et tout est/était/serait/ aurait été à recommencer.
      "One mistake, and everything is/was/would have been to start all over again."
                                                                  (Corminboeuf, 2009)

Ancient Greek:
(6)   Ἀντίλοχ᾽, **εἰ μὲν** δή με κελεύεις οἴκοθεν ἄλλο
      Εὐμήλῳ ἐπιδοῦναι, ἐγὼ **δέ** κε καὶ τὸ τελέσσω.

"Antelope, if (εἰ) on the one hand (μὲν) you ask me to give Eumela something else from my home, then on the other hand (δέ), that is also what I will do." (Denizot, 2013)

Latin:

(7)   Sī quidem mē amāret, tum istuc prōdesset. (Ter. Eun. 446)

"If he loved me, then this would be profitable."   (Meagan, 2014)

English:

(8) He comes, I go = If he come, I shall go.

Mandarin:

(9)   假如她吃苦不来，半路病倒，不是添个累赘么? (钱钟书《围城》)

(10)   买水果，得挑 = 如果买水果，那得挑；下车刷卡！= 要下车就刷卡！

These segmental markers that can be associated with protasis-apodosis systems, or with indirect yes-no questions (Latin and French *si*, Greek *ei*, English *if*), only designate one facet of the complex relationships they mark. We will show in this paper that, like complement clauses and relative clauses, conditional clauses and protasis-apodosis systems in general have no need for segmental markers (Lemaréchal 2015). Non-segmental markers – sequential, integrative or categorial markers – are sufficient (ex. 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 11).

The subjectivity (speaker's ability) is however often decisive to decide on uncertainty and unrealized contingencies.

References

Corminboeuf Gilles, 2009. *L'expression de l'hypothèse en français. Entre hypotaxe subordonnants*. Clermont-Ferrand, Presses universitaires Blaise Pascal.

Denizot Camille, 2013. Le cas des systèmes hypothétiques coordonnés du grec ancien. In Colette Bodelot et al. (éds.), *Morphologie, syntaxe et sémantique des subordonnants*. Bruxelles, De Boek-Duculot.

Haiman John, 1978. Conditionals are topics. *Language,* 59: 781-819.

Josephs Lewis S., 1975. *Palauan Reference Grammar*. Honolulu, The University Press of Hawaii.

Lemaréchal Alain, 2015. Systèmes protase-apodose hypothétiques : " parataxe " et marques susceptibles d'être associées aux systèmes hypothétiques. *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris* CX (2015) /1 : 1-114.

Lyons John. 1977. *Semantics I-II*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Meagan Ayer, 2014. *Allen and Greenough's New Latin Grammar for Schools and Colleges*. Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Dickinson College Commentaries.